


# THE GORDON REVIEW

VOL. IV No. 3



FALL, 1958

*Editor*

LLOYD F. DEAN

✉

*Assistant Editors*

HUDSON T. ARMERDING

DAVID L. FRANZ

PHILIP C. JOHNSON

C. MILBURN KEEN, JR.

THOMAS H. LEITH

ROGER R. NICOLE

THOMAS GRADY SPIRES

DONALD F. TWEEDIE, JR.

✉

*Business Manager*

CHARLES A. HUTTAR

✉

*Subscription Rates*

Single Copy \$ .75

One Year 2.00

✉

Address all correspondence to:

GORDON REVIEW

Beverly Farms, Mass.

## Contents

*A Christian View of Esthetics* — Dean Ebner 107  
*Nudity in Art* DeWitt Whistler Jayne 117  
*Original Sin* William T. Bruner 125

✉ ✉ ✉

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

WEST THE COURT AND THE CASTLE  
SIEGEL SHAKESPEAREAN TRAGEDY  
Charles A. Huttar 137

TILSON SEGREGATION AND THE BIBLE  
Samuel M. Ortegon 141

PRICE MARX MEETS CHRIST  
Archer Torrey 143

HOUGHTON THE VICTORIAN FRAME OF MIND  
Corbin S. Carnell 144

BUIS THE DOCTRINE OF  
ETERNAL PUNISHMENT  
Charles G. Schauffele 145

WALL HENRY WATTERSON  
C. Milburn Keen, Jr. 146

FOWLER OUTLINES FOR THE STUDY OF  
THE BIBLE  
Earl B. Robinson 147

HODGES CHRIST'S KINGDOM AND COMING  
David W. Kerr 148

CRAGG THE CALL OF THE MINARET  
BEWER HARPER'S ANOINTED BIBLE:  
THE PROPHETS  
Philip C. Johnson 149

## SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

Thomas H. Leith

151

The GORDON REVIEW is published quarterly by members of the Gordon Faculties.

Entered as second class matter at Beverly Farms, Mass.

Printed in U.S.A.

## IN THIS ISSUE . . .

It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the field of esthetics is among the most neglected by Evangelicals. Feeling this need, the *Review* is pleased to present two studies in the area. "A Christian View of Esthetics" is an excellent introduction to the whole field of esthetics. Dean Ebner, its author, has already received national recognition in winning the 1957-58 *Atlantic Monthly* Creative Writing Contest. His prize winning essay: "Longinus, Sublimity, and *Paradise Lost*." At present he is a senior candidate for the A.B. at Wheaton College, Illinois. He has received preliminary degree honors and is president of the local chapter of *Lambda Iota Tau*, national literary honor society. His book reviews and articles, especially on art, have appeared frequently in the campus literary magazine.

The problem for the serious Christian of nudity in art is handled by the experienced commercial artist, DeWitt Jayne. Mr. Jayne is a graduate of the Philadelphia School of Industrial Art; Wheaton College, Illinois, B.S. in philosophy and zoology; and has completed his residence work at the University of Chicago for the Ph.D. in art history and archeological criticism. For ten years he was Head of the Art Department at Wheaton. In the Second World War, he was an instructor in engineering drawing and cartography for the U. S. Services. He has held a number of positions of a commercial nature as illustrator, designer and art director. He has recently served as art editor, cover artist, and principal illustrator of the *American Mercury*. Presently, he is engaged in the completion of his doctoral program at the University of Pennsylvania. Previous writings have appeared in *Eternity*.

William T. Bruner, Ph.D., presents an attempt at a more adequate formulation of the theological and philosophical implications of the doctrine of original sin. Dr. Bruner holds the B.A. from Furman University, and the Th.M. and Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. He has taken additional work at Boston University. A number of articles have been published in the Baptist *Western Recorder*. *The Personalist* recently presented his "Dialectical Personalism and the Problem of Original Sin." He has two volumes in manuscript form: *New Light on the Problem of Original Sin* and *Why Children Sin*. Dr. Bruner has taught at Hazard Baptist Institute, Bob Jones University, and Western Christian College. He is a member of the Evangelical Theological Society.

*Among our reviewers:* Samuel M. Ortegon is the author of several books including *The Making of Social Ideas* and was Professor of Sociology at the Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary. Archer Torrey is Rector of Saint Michael's Theological College (Anglican), Seoul, Korea. Corbin Carnell is a member of the English Department at the University of Florida.

# A CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ESTHETICS

DEAN EBNER

Art is unavoidable. It is a vital part of the clothes we wear and the houses we build, as well as the music we enjoy. Because beauty is relevant to the deepest human experiences, it is a worthy subject for serious philosophical thinking, especially for the Christian, who inherits a vast tradition of art. We turn our attention, then, to a survey of the exceedingly broad subject of Esthetics. I shall attempt to focus attention on five basic areas: (1) the definition of art, (2) the creative process, (3) the work of art, (4) the appreciation of art, and (5) art and Christianity.

Theories of Esthetics are not demonstrated, they are offered. And this Christian view of the problem is no exception. If one position could be demonstrated, then all thinking people would be in essential agreement. Since this is not the case, it is evident that all theories of Esthetics rest on certain basic assumptions, and the rest is persuasion. With this in mind, I propose the following: A Christian view of Esthetics, based upon the assumption that there is a God, who reveals Himself in nature, in man, and in Scripture, will best fit the facts of total experience, and will be the most logically consistent system to explain these facts.

## 1. *The Definition of Art*

There have been many viewpoints regarding the primary factor in art. To some, the key to the interpretation of art is *reason* or *intellect* (Aquinas, Kant, Maritain), to others it is *imitation* (Read), *imagination* (Fry), *intuition* (Croce, Bergson), *play* (Freud), *fulfillment of wish or desire* (Freud, Read), *emotion* (Tolstoy, Ducasse), *pleasure* (Santayana), *technique and medium* (Bosanquet), *sensuous surfaces* (Prall), *meaning* (Hospers), *form* (Read, Bradley, Parker), *truth* (Keats), *isolation* (Munsterberg), *esthetic distance* (Ortega y Gasset), *instrumentality and context* (Dewey, Whitehead), *abstraction*, or *empathy*.<sup>1</sup>

Undoubtedly there is a large measure of truth in each of these emphases for art is far too great to be reduced to a single notion. Just how each of these fits into a Christian view of Esthetics will become apparent. But the main statement that must be made at the outset is this: *Art is primarily an expression of values*. It involves many other things, but art is seen to be, first of all, the language whereby we express to each other those interests and appreciations that we value most in our experience. Thus Sophocles in *Oedipus Rex*, Michelangelo in *Pieta*, and Brahms in the *Requiem Mass* are all communicating the valuable thought that death is beautiful; Gothic cathedrals communicated certain valuable religious attitudes; Van

1. Melvin Rader, *Esthetics* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1957), p. xii.

Gogh and Walt Whitman taught the value of democratic ideas; and the Renaissance painters showed the value of perspective and space.

Any theory of Esthetics attempting to define art in this way, as the expression of value, will be found to include at least two further concepts, inherent in the definition: (1) the connection of beauty with truth and goodness, and (2) an absolute scale of values, with God at the apex. Let us deal briefly with these two concepts.

Beauty in art communicates valuable truth. The fact that we constantly demand of a piece of art, "What is it? What is he trying to say?" is a good indication that there can be no great art apart from a valid, valuable message. We must agree with John Ruskin that, among other things, art is that which contributes a number of the greatest ideas. Goodness is the other aspect of value that is seen in the beauty of art. It is difficult to see how art, which involves the whole nature of man, can remain isolated from moral behaviour. Although art is not chiefly a moral affair, the fact that it is a practice and an enjoyment certainly places it within the moral sphere.

The very connection of the value of beauty with truth and goodness will bring us naturally to the second concept inherent in our definition of art; namely, that value can be the judge for ranking pieces of art on an absolute scale of approval or greatness. At this point there will be immediate response by those, such as Ducasse, who define beauty as the ability to yield pleasant feelings, that beauty is relative to subjective, personal preference and is all a matter of what each person likes or dislikes. Such a view is wrong for a number of reasons. First, this involves the wrong definition of art. Of course feelings are relative, but value is not. Also, a relativist is seen to be inconsistent in that he has a dogmatic yardstick of his own which would cause him to voice such an opinion in the first place. After all, if beauty is relative, why write essays about it? Finally (and this is the most important criticism of a relative position) it violates common critical experience. For, we all make it a common practice to use the word "better" in our vocabulary, and this word implies a scale of some sort whereby we unanimously rate *Paradise Lost* higher as poetry than "Thirty Days Hath September." But perhaps this position would become more palpable to our friends who believe that art is a matter of feeling and therefore relative, if we would make certain very necessary qualifications of our usage of the term "absolute." First of all, let it be said that an absolute standard of value and an absolute perception of that standard are two different things. The Fall of man, affecting as it did both the rational and moral aspects of the image of God in man, must have also seriously affected his ability to perceive those two aspects of value. And we can immediately see that this is true to our experience. We know that the absolute standard of value is there, because we find it easy to rate *Paradise Lost* and "Thirty Days Hath September" since these are at

nearly opposite ends of the scale. But it is not so easy to compare *Paradise Lost* and *Hamlet* for true value, since they are much closer together on the scale. Our exact perception of the absolute standard has been weakened by the Fall. Next, a further qualification seriously hampers our dogmatic use of the term "absolute." There are certain transcultural relatives (for example, beauty in women) where we hesitate to apply any kind of absolute rating, because there are some criteria of beauty to which we are not conditioned. This argument, however, is simply a limitation to the perception and application of some value judgments and does not in any way prove the relative position. There are certain things which are beautiful in any culture—a sunset, for example.

Ultimately, our definition of art as the expression of value including truth and goodness, and providing a criterion for rating art according to some sort of absolute standard, will be seen to lead us to God. For value is not only a common experience of man (created in God's image) and a common concept of Scripture, but God Himself is said to be at the height of the value scale, since it is He Who is Absolute Beauty, Absolute Truth, and Absolute Goodness.

Before turning to a discussion of the creative process, one further thing must be mentioned regarding our definition of art. This definition, in addition to harmonizing with Christian Orthodoxy and with our experience in general, will also be the best means of pointing out the difference between art and science. Whereas science involves the description and measurement of objective, verifiable *facts*, art, on the other hand, presents immediate, selected, transmitted, organized, clarified, significant, warm, vivid *values*.<sup>2</sup> Although both science and art are concerned with truth, art is far more exciting, for it gives us a grasp of the *essence* of a thing. It describes the bird on the wing, not the bird on the dissecting table.

## 2. *The Creative Process*

What, generally, is the artist doing when he creates? When we attempt to answer this question we are almost forced to use the word "intuition." And although we would probably not want to agree with Henri Bergson that intuition is some sort of strange faculty whereby we get information apart from the senses and the mind, we would, nevertheless, agree with him and with Benedetto Croce that the artist does use creative intuition; i.e., he has a direct vision, whereby he penetrates to the real nature of his subject with an imaginary grasp of the unique.<sup>3, 4</sup> Note also the general matter of this creative grasp. The artist is not simply describing Carl Jung's visionary, mystical, demonic, primordial, irrational night world of the collective un-

2. Melvin Rader, *Esthetics* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1957), pp. xxvi-xxix.

3. Henri Bergson, "The Individual and the Type," *Ibid.*, pp. 114-26.

4. Benedetto Croce, "Intuition and Expression," *op. cit.*, pp. 94-113.

conscious.<sup>5</sup> But rather, he is talking about the ordinary world of men, in a much more intense way than it is usually perceived. And in doing this, the artist not only talks about the demonic world of man's knowledge, but also about the utopian world. And thus the whole range of moral experience is portrayed.

When we attempt to trace the creative process through its specific stages, we are almost faced with an impossibility. The fount of creation nearly defies analysis. In most cases, however, the creative process does pass through certain recognizable stages: (1) hard work, (2) sharp inception, and (3) hard work. The first stage involves the artist's normal daily work in any given area of creation. He is "soaking" certain problems, ideas, forms, techniques, and so on. He is acquainted with his field; he is a prepared man.

The stage of sharp inception involves a large quantity of what is generally known as "inspiration." This process may be described as follows: In the middle of ordinary life, the artist, who has a keen power of observation, suddenly meets an event in life (an object, a mood, a conversation, and so on) which triggers a breakthrough of certain beautiful relationships from the subconscious into the conscious.<sup>6</sup> A certain part of the work is thus "given" by "inspiration" with no apparent effort. It is "the given line," or "a virus of suggestion," or a "germ." The next stage of the creative process involves a unifying, an organization, a forming of the material begun with the "germ." It is an inspired development, but here the emphasis is on hard effort in which the artist, now a possessed man, feels like a beaten fool pursuing endless blind alleys. It is, as Stephen Spender so well said, like "wrestling with a god."<sup>7</sup> The artist feels that he must create or be destroyed by the thing which has taken hold of him. Finally the art object is finished and the process is complete.

Thomas Wolfe describes the entire creative act, from start to finish, in these words:

It was a process that began in a whirling vortex and creative chaos and that proceeded slowly at the expense of infinite confusion, toil and error toward clarification and the articulation of an ordered and formal structure.<sup>8</sup>

Throughout this creative process, there are at least two prominent accompanying factors in nearly every case: (1) a great use of memory, and (2) an absorbing concentration.

5. Carl Jung, "Psychology and Literature," *The Creative Process*, ed. by Brewster Ghiselin (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1957), pp. 208-223.
6. Henri Poincaré, "Mathematical Creation," *Ibid.*, pp. 33-42.
7. Stephen Spender, "The Making of a Poem," *The Creative Process*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124.
8. Thomas Wolfe, "The Story of a Novel," *Ibid.*, pp. 187.

In this discussion of the creative process I have purposely avoided any dissection of the artist's mental anatomy, other than the rather obvious division between the subconscious and the conscious activity. Although Freud would certainly wish to advocate a theory built upon a three-fold division of the human mind and traced to the unfulfilled desires of the psychotic artist,<sup>9</sup> and although Carl Jung would want to trace the creative process into some sort of a "primordial vision" involving a demonic world of the collective unconscious,<sup>10</sup> I feel that the serious limitations of Freudian and Behaviouristic Psychology in analyzing human behaviour compel us to look no further than we already have. Rather, we would do well to look up—to the ultimate source of all creation—God. For whatever the human mind is and has, it is made in the image of God, in Whom "we live and move and have our being." Thus the "inspiration" which the artist manifests in the creative process can be directly traced to the common grace of God—"the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

Before leaving this subject to analyze the art object which the artist has produced, it is necessary to show just how the artist expresses value in his creative act. For in the creative process the artist is not merely giving an objective embodiment to his emotions or to his pleasure, he is doing much more. He is, as an integrated human being (with physical, moral, intellectual, emotional, and religious characteristics) actually imparting value to his work. This not only calls for a high intellectual capacity, but also for great moral sensitivity. Thus, we raise the question of the importance of the artist's personal, moral life to the greatness of his art. Can an immoral artist produce great and valuable art?

In answering this question the solution will lie in a careful disassociation of art from outward morality. The main moral value of an artist's work will not be conditioned primarily by his overt practice of good or evil, but rather by his inner awareness of the range of the moral struggle of man. In the final analysis, however, it is probable that an artist's work will be greater if he is viewing the full range of moral struggle from the side of goodness rather than the side of evil. As John Milton and John Ruskin maintained, art of the very highest kind will require noble, moral, and right-minded men.

We suggest that the best formulation of the various aspects of an art object is as follows:<sup>11</sup>

9. Herbert Read, "Art and the Unconscious," *Esthetics, op. cit.*, pp. 143-155.

10. Carl Jung, *op. cit.*

11. Melvin Rader, *Esthetics* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1957). p. 230.

## MATERIALS (CONTENT)

### 1. Purely Sensuous Materials:

- a. properties of the medium (the physical capabilities of the materials the artist uses).
- b. *abstract sensuous elements* (such as color, line, tone, and pitch).

### 2. Referential Materials:

- a. representations
- b. connotations

Content and form are two aspects of one thing in the organic unity of their relational parts. Only as they are placed together can they form the "something beyond," the "infinite suggestion" of art.<sup>13</sup> Realizing this, we must be on our guard against an overemphasis on either aspect.

## 4. *The Appreciation of Art*

In this section we will deal with two general areas: (1) the esthetic experience, and (2) the relationship of art and life. There are two distinct reactions to any art object which stands before an observer: an empathetic contemplative reaction and a critical reaction, which involves a judgment of worth. These two types of esthetic experience deserve a closer analysis.

In the Fall, among many other things, man lost his wonder of nature and of beauty.<sup>14</sup> As a result, the largest part of our life is spent in ordinary experience which involves specialized vision, moral action, and responsibility. But in all of this ordinary experience we have a deep longing for the unique. It is when we are suddenly confronted with a beautiful art object (or with beauty in nature) that our experience changes into one of contemplation. First, the art object catches our attention. And in this connection it is interesting to note that the elements of form mentioned previously (theme, thematic variation, balance, rhythm, hierarchy, and evolution) are strikingly similar to the psychological factors of attention: change, strength, striking quality, and definiteness of form.<sup>15</sup> And then the true contemplative experience begins. It is ". . . *rapt attention* which involves the *intransitive apprehension* of an object's *immanent meanings and values* in their *full presentational immediacy*."<sup>16</sup> Several other things need to be said about this experience:

12. DeWitt H. Parker, "The Problem of Esthetic Form," *Ibid.*, pp. 357-370.

13. Andrew Cecil Bradley, "Poetry for Poetry's Sake," *op. cit.*, pp. 335-356.

14. Clyde S. Kilby.

15. Eliseo Vivas, *Creation and Discovery* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1955).

16. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

## FORM

The organization of all these elements into an organic unity by theme, thematic variation, balance, rhythm, hierarchy, and evolution.<sup>12</sup>

1. It is not scientific analysis, but an intuiting of the immediate essence of the object.
2. The experience is complete and insular — isolated from practical life. However, this isolation allows a contemplation of relationships — "solitude where we are least alone." (Words-worth).
3. The emotions and desires are inextricably fused with the specific qualities of the object ("carried away").
4. It is not chiefly a religious or moral experience but it does involve the whole man and so is a valuable experience.
5. It naturally leads into the critical experience in which one asks, "Why is this beautiful?" But if it is mixed with the critical experience, both are less intense.

We now turn to a brief look at the critical esthetic experience. This experience could be historical or re-creative, but we are primarily concerned with the judicial aspect of criticism — an evaluation of the art object according to worth. Of course, there are those individuals who feel that there can be no valid critical experience. These would limit the enjoyment of art to contemplation only. To them (usually relativists or members of the "art for art's sake" school) art is to be enjoyed, not analyzed. An answer to this position is to be found in these words of Eliseo Vivas:

The empirical, contingent connection, then, between physical structure, embodied *value*, and a spectator's capacity under favorable conditions to discover it, makes criticism an intelligent objective activity which is capable of guiding taste and correcting the artist's practice.<sup>17</sup>

Of course we realize that contemplation is the most vital esthetic experience — that a rose and talk about a rose are two different things. And yet, taken with a grain of salt, our talk about roses can certainly help us to appreciate them.

If criticism is valid, then, what criterion should we use for evaluation? For any type of judgment of worth must involve some kind of value system, and "except a man believe *rightly*, he cannot be saved" (Athanasian Creed). Although possible criteria could be originality of genius, excellence of technique, success in expression, vividness of quality, or practical effects, the best criterion for judgment is *value*; i.e., how true and profound are the insights into our deepest conviction of what reality is. If we accept this criterion of judgment, then we will see that the miscellaneous views of any observers are not as valid as those opinions expressed by persons whose tastes have been educated to recognize value in an art object — critics. This is not to say that the man in the street can have no valid opinions about a work of art. It is just to say that the opinions of the critics will be more valid — they

17. Eliseo Vivas, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

have lived with the problems. All of this simply fits our experience, for those works of art have survived which have contributed something valuable to many people of taste and intelligence over a long period of time.

There has been much dispute over the relationship of art to life. Some have argued that art is separate from the rest of life (isolationists). For Ortega y Gasset, "Life is one thing and poetry is another." For Oscar Wilde, art exists for its own sake. While Benedetto Croce maintains that art is "... opposed to the practical of any sort," and that it possesses a "purely artistic function," there have been those who have argued that art is integrated with life (contextualists). For them, "Art . . . is the only [universal] language we possess whereby we can vividly transmit our *values* to others."<sup>18</sup> They put their emphasis on the social universality of art. I think we will have to agree with this last view, having defined art as the expression of values. However, there are elements of truth in both positions. Art is individual and unique. It is not morality, religion, technology, or reform, but at the same time we must realize that art is no mere piddling luxury; it is related to life. It is a particular means we use to communicate values. And since life itself is little more than the experience of these values, art becomes as large as life. With these qualifications, then, art is seen to be both unique and universal.

Isolationists will not be satisfied with this formulation, for they will insist that if we relate art to life, we make it functional. This is clearly not the case, for there is another definition of the word "functional" besides scientific practicality. Art is useful, not in the practical sense, but useful to the spirit of man. Wordsworth's poetry will not help me to build a house, but it will make me a better man. We do not have to have roses in the world, but they are useful to the spirit of man.

### 5. *Art and Christianity*

Man was created as an esthetic creature. In all ages, he has interpreted nature and life with art that produced a powerful moral effect. This was especially true in Old Testament times when numerous art objects were used as external symbols of Israel's covenant with God. It was also true in the classical art of pagan Greece and Rome. But it was not true in the early Church. Had man's esthetic nature changed? Had the spiritual reality of the Incarnation eliminated the necessity of symbolic art? Was art to be regarded as "of the world?" The lack of art in the early Church is a serious problem to the Twentieth Century Christian interested in forming a Christian theory of Esthetics. For the clear fact is, that the early Church shied away from art and regarded it as essentially pagan. And that is exactly what it

18. Melvin Rader, *Esthetics* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1957), pp. xxiii.

was. So it becomes apparent that the distrustful attitude the new Church expressed toward art was not due to any anti-Scriptural or anti-Christian character that art might possess, but due to the fact that art was so thoroughly identified with pagan culture—so thoroughly “of the world.” But it was not long before the Church began to seek the service of art to represent its message in many types of symbols. And during the Middle Ages art played a very dominant role in the Catholic Church. With the Renaissance came a tremendous secularization of art and until the early part of the Twentieth Century art was made to serve an ever rising *zeitgeist* of skeptical Naturalism. With the semi-revival of religious art in our times, it becomes necessary to consider again the full purpose that art should have in and through the Christian Church.

We have seen earlier in this paper that art is the expression of values. We have said that there can be no great art apart from a valid message. When we apply this theory to Christian art, we find that its purpose is *to make visible the truth of God in man and in nature*. This means that Christian art cannot serve limited and selfish ends. It cannot be allowed to become an end in itself. It cannot even stop with nature. But it must point us to God. It must center around a valuable spiritual message.

Immediately on advancing such a theory we will be accused of using art as a propaganda tool. And we will admit that we do wish to use art as a propaganda tool for the Christian cause, but we must define the word “propaganda.” For, it is the function of art to communicate truth, and in one sense all truth is “propaganda.” But it is not the function of art to communicate truth didactically and directly. Thus, in the Bible as well as in the works of John Milton and Charles Dickens a Christian truth is advanced in an oblique manner—in the truly artistic manner. Hence it is not Christian art that is wrong, but it is bad Christian art that is wrong. To teach truth directly is science; to teach it obliquely is art.

Before turning to a discussion of one specific type of Christian art, the Christian novel, a further word should be said about the direct use of art to edify believers. Since this type of art is aimed at communicating a certain spiritual truth, and since all people have not completed their esthetic education, we must meet the Christian public at their artistic level in order to communicate the truth, and at the same time seek to raise their level of appreciation. This is simply to advocate the use of a good Gospel chorus at a youth meeting, rather than “And Can it Be That I Should Gain!”

I have decided to discuss briefly the Christian novel because of the problems, common to all Christian art, which this topic naturally raises. May I first make a plea for artistic freedom. Christian art must gladly enroll in the service of Biblical concepts, but it will defeat its purpose if it enrolls

in the service of trite expressions of these concepts. The Christian novelist is free to follow the artistic example of Scripture in avoiding direct teaching in favor of symbol, metaphor, parable, personification, dialogue, and so on.

... As long as Christians are little frightened people, thinking and writing under the restriction of fellow-Christians and not by compulsion of the Holy Spirit, so long will the Church of Christ, whose great writings, like her Sacred Scriptures and her Head Himself, have always been revolutionary to the age's opinions and attitudes, lag behind in literature, dumb except for a babble of little, set, rehearsed speech-makers, lacking the organ voices to translate once again what can be translated of her ineffable mysteries into a tongue . . . "understanding of the people."<sup>19</sup>

A Christian novelist, who is dedicated to the advancement of holiness, will face a real problem in the portrayal of moral evil in his books. Too often in the past the result has been characters that were so good that they were devoid of personality. The problem is a real one, since a Christian is used to hating evil wherever he sees it. What, then, is the answer? Certainly it is in this very simple rule: present the world as it is. There are saints and sinners in the world, and the Christian novelist will teach an inherent, natural lesson if he simply represents the full scale of moral experience. This will call for avoiding two extremes because neither extreme is true: (1) burying one's head in the sand and ignoring moral evil (thus presenting dishonest characters), and (2) burying one's head in a garbage pail (by dwelling on evil).

The Christian should (with equal ability) be a better creative artist than the unbeliever, for the Christian is rightly related to the One who is Absolute Beauty. The Christian has insights into the meaning of the world which are closed to the unbeliever. There is all the difference between destiny and a meaningless cycle, between revelation and blindness, between life and death. The Christian should be able to face the facts of life with a keener appreciation of loveliness, with greater perspective, and with a serene joy. The fact that Christians are producing so little real art in these days is due in part to a lack of interest in developing natural ability, and to a lack of natural ability. (For it must always be remembered that God pours out creative genius on the just and unjust alike, and Christians are in a decided numerical minority.)

The Christian should likewise be able to appreciate true beauty and good art more than a non-Christian of comparable esthetic maturity. There is truth in the little verse:

Heaven above is softer blue,  
Earth around is sweeter green!  
Something lives in every hue  
Christless eyes have never seen.

A proof of this is found in Titus 3: 15: "To the pure all things are pure,

19. Grace Irwin, "What is a Christian Novel?" *Gordon Review*, II, 2, 1958, p. 72.

but to the corrupt and unbelieving nothing is pure; their very minds and consciences are corrupted." How can a man with corrupted intellectual and moral faculties possibly see the full value of a work of art? The Christian is obligated to view and produce that art which will edify the most. "All things are ours" and "to the pure all things are pure" but we must always remember that "all things are not expedient, all things edify not." We have no time for mere artistic luxury. We must search for valuable art which will build us up:

Finally my brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.

(Philippians 4: 8)

## NUDITY IN ART: A CHRISTIAN APPRAISAL

DEWITT WHISTLER JAYNE

Confronted with this subject, the writer is well aware of the magnitude of the task and the difficulties inherent in its consideration. Simply the study of the nude in art from critical and historical viewpoints is a study of no mean scope. When one realizes that classic Renaissance, and neo-classic art was dominated by the nude, and that to this day the nude is the chief concern of the art of visual representation,<sup>1</sup> it is no wonder that most of the critics, scholars and writers in the field of art have made their pertinent comments. It is, therefore, remarkable to note that until 1956 there was not one general work on the subject published in English.

When a writer is faced with the problem of formulating a Christian approach to the subject, the task is further complicated, not so much by the lack of scholarly material upon which to draw, as by the lack on the part of Christians of understanding of the field of art criticism in general, and a similar lack of a sound philosophy of the relation of Christianity to culture. Such being the case, it is more than possible that we will raise more questions than we answer—and that is doubtless as it should be. So large a subject can scarcely be introduced in the confines of an article such as this, so the writer can only hope that the thesis he develops will be considered at least an *attempt* at a Christian approach to the problem of nudity in art and that others will be stimulated to explore further the myriad of questions suggested by it.

1. It is fundamental to all figure drawing and is still the greatest challenge to an artist's skill.

Most concern over the propriety of the use of the nude figure in art is confined to representation that is realistic in concept. *September Morn* caused considerably more furor among moralists than did *Nude Descending the Stairs*, which was exhibited in New York the same year. Therefore we will confine our attention to the realistic tradition as it has existed from the statuary of Praxiteles to paintings from the contemporary scene. Primitives and expressionists are beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore in order to restrict this paper to a reasonable length, the writer is limiting the present study entirely to the female nude, hoping in so doing that whatever factors may be found to govern the one may be presumed to involve the male nude as well. Erotic or pornographic implications seem to be most often associated with female nudity, so it is therefore of greater and more immediate concern to Christian inquiry.

From the fourth century B.C.<sup>2</sup> to the beginning of the Christian era the nude was the accepted art form for sculpture of the classic world. This tradition was revived in the Renaissance and has persisted to a diminishing degree to our own day. To the ancients, the viewing of a female nude figure in marble was a stimulating and evocative experience as we learn from descriptions of the original *Knidian Venus* by Pliny and the false Lucian. Our virtual lack of reaction to a marble Venus certainly cannot be attributed entirely to the fact that our copies of lost Greek originals are so poor. Rather let us suggest that in that day literary descriptions of nudity were not capable of being widely circulated; paintings involving nude figures were schematic and decorative; and statuary was the only satisfactory art for conveying the sensuous beauty of the undraped figure. Sculpture had no competition.

However the rhapsodies occasioned by the famous statues of antiquity were not evoked by cold, sightless, impersonal images in white marble. The surface of the marble was tinted in delicate flesh tones; the hair was softly colored, eyebrows pencilled in and the lips carefully rouged. The sightless, impersonal eyes were enlivened with colored irises and the general illusion of reality must have been quite remarkable. The idea of painting a statue seems at first thought a bit primitive, but let us remember that, after all, it is the average cigar store Indian upon which we unconsciously base our judgment that was the primitive affair. The art of coloring a statue in the sophisticated fourth century was of such a high degree of development that Praxiteles is quoted as preferring those of his works which had been colored by Nikias, evidently a specialist in the business. The closest approximation today to the impact of such an art can only be suggested by the shock of surprise experienced when one unexpectedly encounters an unclothed fashion mannequin in a department store window.

2. The male nude was introduced in the fifth century, B. C., the female not until the fourth.

From the days of the Renaissance, sculpture has been left uncolored, except for accidental or induced patina, and the resultant cold impersonality could not compete with the warmth and illusion of the nude figure as developed in painting. For western man since the Renaissance the nude has been so much more sensuously portrayed in paint that sculpture has been relegated to a minor role, and its impact of late years has been so slight that even the Victorian mind which pronounced the Titian *Venus of Urbino* as utterly indecent, could easily tolerate a bronze or alabaster reproduction of the *Venus de Medici* in the place of honor on the drawing room table.

In our day, the third contender for delineating the nude is much in evidence—literature. It may be suggested that literature and the arts of sculpture and painting should not be compared on the same basis—i.e., that nudity described in literature is less erotic than that which is shown pictorially. The exact opposite happens to be more nearly the truth. Literature with its imagery is far more evocative of physical desire than painting. The literary description requires the reader to produce his own mental image which is doubtless subjectively satisfying. On the other hand the person beholding a painting is immediately aware of the artist's shortcoming, the model's odd proportions, an unsatisfying pose, or a differing ideal of beauty.

Time and circumstances doubtless are factors in our response to the different arts. Pictures, including reproductions of paintings, are so commonplace with us that even double page full color spreads of some of the greatest female nudes ever painted have been published in our weekly magazines, and have probably been casually flipped over by most readers with little more interest than that accorded the breakfast food ad on the following page. On the other hand if one pauses to read a poetic description such as is found in the *Song of Songs*, he is probably alone with the author in his thoughts and by the very act of reading is adding the ingredient of time. The cumulative impact of the literary piece is for us considerably greater than that of the visual.

Yet surely to describe an action in words is one degree further removed from nature than to portray it in paint, and it would be difficult to make plain to a jury that illicit emotions may be stirred up by a written description of a statue and of a picture, whereas the picture and the statue do not awaken any such thoughts in the beholder.<sup>3</sup>

Yet, Sir Kenneth Clark makes the point when he notes that

The Hebrew basis of our religion has accustomed us to a literary rather than to a visual evocation of physical desire. Compared to the imagery of the *Song of Songs*, the appeal of the *Knidian* is mild and restrained.<sup>4</sup>

3. Moore, George, *Avowals*, Boni and Liveright, 1919.

4. *The Nude*, Pantheon, 1956.

Let us take a fresh look some of the descriptive passages in the *Song of Songs*.

How beautiful are thy feet with shoes,  
O Prince's daughter!  
The joints of thy thighs are like jewels,  
The work of the hands of a cunning workman.  
Thy navel is like a round goblet,  
Which wanteth not liquor:  
Thy belly is like an heap of wheat  
Set about with lilies.  
Thy two breasts are like two young roes  
That are twins.  
Thy neck is as a tower of ivory;  
Thine eyes like the fishpools in Heshbon,  
By the gates of Bathrabbim:  
Thy nose is as the tower of Lebanon  
Which looketh toward Damascus.  
Thine head upon thee is like Carmel,  
And the hair of thine head like purple;  
The king is held in the galleries.  
How fair and how pleasant art thou,  
O love, for delights!  
This thy stature is like to a palm tree,  
And thy breasts to clusters of grapes.  
I said, I will go up to the palm tree,  
I will take hold of the boughs thereof:  
Now also thy breasts shall be as clusters of the vine,  
And the smell of thy nose like apples;  
And the roof of thy mouth like the best wine for my beloved,  
That goeth down sweetly,  
Causing the lips of those that are asleep to speak.

\* \* \*

Thy two breasts are like two young roes that are twins,  
Which feed among the lilies.  
Until the day break, and the shadows flee away,  
I will get me to the mountain of myrrh,  
And to the hill of frankincense.  
Thou art all fair, my love;  
There is no spot in thee.

With these lines the writer of the *Song of Songs* pours out his ecstatic description of a nude female figure. In spite of a lack of cultural compatibility and consequent difficulties of translation intensified by the poetic nature of the writing, it is still evident to us that here is an undisputed masterpiece of erotic poetry. By the use of similes, some of which are rather strange to our ears, the poet attempts to idealize and monumentalize the beauty of his subject. However, lest she become simply an objective symbol of beauty, he goes much further and addresses his poem of praise directly to her—a particular individual—with the result that we are in possession of a highly personal and intimate portrait. In doing this, the author has lovingly singled out her various charms one by one, and by interjecting himself into the imagery has succeeded inescapably in placing the portrait in a frame of frankly erotic significance.

There are doubtless as many interpretations of the alleged allegory of this poem as there are commentators — which would suggest to the writer that it is very possibly not an allegory at all. Obviously, any Biblical allusion to the relation of the bride and the bridegroom certainly finds enrichment in the culminating truth of the relation of Christ to His church. But the compulsive attempt, on the part of so many Victorian or would-be Victorian expositors, to spiritualize the meaning of phrase after phrase of an obviously physical description, leads one to suspect that there is more than a hint of truth in Clark's observation.

That fear of the body which we usually call Victorian is a subject worthy of more disinterested examination than it has yet received. Unlike the scruples of the early Christians, it had no religious motive and was not connected with a cult of chastity. Rather it seems to have been a necessary part of that enormous facade behind which the social revolution of the nineteenth Century could adjust itself. The unwritten code of physical respectability that was then produced seems at first to be full of inconsistencies, but analysis proves it to have had one overriding aim, to avoid the coarseness of truth. Thus it was possible to fill a conservatory with nude figures in Carrara marble, although the mention of an ankle was held to be a gross indecency.<sup>5</sup>

At least in its literary form, we have here a poem which is a gem of artistic expression wherein considerable verbal imagery is devoted to revealing the nude charms of an oriental woman of striking beauty. The portrayal is not couched in lofty abstract terms such as one would use in describing the impersonal beauty of a *Knidian Venus*, but on the contrary the language is warmly sensuous, personal, intimate and definitely erotic in quality. And this is by divine inspiration! Appropriately, however, cautious writers on the subject of the nude in art have suggested, with Samuel Alexander, that "if the nude is so treated that it raises in the spectator ideas or desires appropriate to the material subject, it is false art, and bad morals."<sup>6</sup> Similar statements are frequently met in Christian and other conservative circles where the appreciation of the nude in art is seldom taken beyond a guided tour of the Elgin marbles with sidelong glances at the *Knidian Venus* and a few assorted plaster casts of equally uninspired copies of lost Greek originals. Any representation of nudity, particularly in painting, which is more immediate, personal, and sensuous is highly suspect, and is probably to be condemned as being more or less immoral.

Regardless of the mass of taboo and tradition behind such judgment there is no basis for it to be found in any Christian (i.e. New Testament) revelation *per se*. If the Old Testament is appealed to, one finds that in the Mosaic law, nudity, or nakedness as viewed by another is prohibited only when associated with certain unlawful sexual situations, (Lev. 18) and as

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, London, 1933.

probably exemplified in Gen. 9: 22-24. And Gen. 2: 25 and 3: 7, 21 doubtless take on a larger significance of a ceremonial and eschatological nature—the problem being primarily one of guiltiness before God. This guilt is eradicated by redemption which puts the Christian intellectually and spiritually in a position equal to or higher than that suggested in Gen. 2: 25—hence the suitability of our enjoyment in complete liberty of the ecstasy of the *Song of Songs*.

In this poem the author brings us empathetically into his experience as he discovers the naked beauties of his beloved, until we share a measure of his transport of delight. The revelation of her nudity places such expression on a plane above other human experience and we bow in reverence, thanking our God for creating us male and female with capacity for such enjoyment which is an eternal verity—realized in the union of Christ with His church. Such imagery is so highly charged with erotic content that we begin to sense that what is so vital and lovely to the regenerate mind is acutely beyond the capacity of our surrounding culture. As H. Richard Niebuhr says,

The disorder in the emotional and rational life of man is acutely felt in the great disturbance of his existence by sexual passion; but it appears also in all other expressions of his libido. The disordered soul is corrupt in all its parts, not because a part has been disordered but because the fundamental relation of the soul to God has been disordered. To mankind with this perverted nature and corrupted culture Jesus Christ has come to heal and renew what sin has infected with sickness unto death. By His life and His death He makes plain to man the greatness of God's love and the depth of the human sin; by revelation and instruction He reattaches the soul to God, the source of its being and goodness and restores to it the right order of love, causing it to love whatever it loves in God and not in the context of selfishness or of idolatrous devotion to the creature.<sup>7</sup>

The truth of Titus 1: 15 becomes a staggering reality. "Unto the pure all things are pure; but unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure; but even their mind and conscience is defiled." Culture apart from God becomes "an anticipatory substitute for the heavenly gift, hence also and fundamentally a harmonic secularization of creative freedom."<sup>8</sup> Even as in the final revelation of God to man "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us—full of grace and truth" so the supreme symbol of our culture became the body of the "perfect man." The Greeks anticipated this truth in the fifth century and introduced the nude not as merely one subject of many, but as an art form in itself. They, as we, were not content with imitation of the figure as it is, but were obsessed with the idea of transforming and perfecting the naked body into what it should be—the realization of an ideal. Using the *Song of Songs* as a standard of judgment for evaluating the nude in artistic expression, we are prepared as Christians to endorse not only idealization, but also the sensuous, the personal, the erotic qualities of the female nude.

7. *Christ and Culture*, Harpers, 1951.

8. Brunner, Emil, *Eternal Hope*, Westminster, 1954.

However, inasmuch as we are dealing with art, we judge not only the subject but the quality of its presentation. Art certainly does not exist for art's sake. It may be prized for the elements of delight and pleasure to be drawn from it, but its ultimate worth lies in its moral value. *Art must seek truth, and great art must be the product of moral judgment* even though the truth be incomplete and the judgment warped. We are witnessing man's great striving to regain what he has lost and what he still rejects at the hand of God. As Brunner says, "Culture has always a Promethean, Titanic air about it."<sup>9</sup> He has also suggested that the supreme symbol of our culture has been the body of the "perfect man." In this anticipation of the truth later revealed in the incarnation, the Greek sculptors strove valiantly to realize the ideal in the nude male figure—but in vain. At best, they could attempt a figure which would seem partly human and partly divine. The concept of "very God" and "very man" was, and is, beyond the capacity of the art medium. The fifth century athletes by Polykleitos were lacking in spiritual quality, while the fourth century *Hermes* by Praxiteles is so idealized that his humanity and masculinity are all but lost. In attempting to achieve a proper balance between the physical and the spiritual, the ideal was finally crystallized in the Apollo-type—as in the second century Apollo Belvidere which is disappointingly insipid and effeminate (It is interesting that these same qualities prevail to our own day in western painting where the representation of the person of Christ is involved).

However disappointing the result achieved in the male nude, the attempt to produce the "perfect man" (generically) in the female nude was an entirely different problem; one that came much closer to successful fulfillment. The revelation of the "perfect man" in Christian truth is found not only in the unique incarnation of the Redeemer, but in the perfecting of the ones redeemed through faith in him. For these, the inspired figure of the New Testament revelation is the bride, the female lover and object of love.

It is then, no accident that the Greek ideal is most successfully realized in the figure of Venus. Though a goddess in name, the sculptured Venus was a far cry from the remote deities of the draped *Athena Lemnia* type. With the development of the nude ideal, the human element became increasingly dominant, except in inferior and falsely idealized copies, to the point where even the identity of the models who posed for such immortality was given considerable public recognition. However, nearly all of the complete statues of Venus we possess today are inferior Hellenistic or Roman copies, many of which are badly restored.

The finest of the lot should be the *Knidian Venus* by Praxiteles. The marvelous quality of his work as exemplified in the fragmentary *Hermes*

9. *Ibid.*

and the beauty of both Phryne (his model) and the original statue are glowingly documented. But the sweetness, beauty, and restraint attributed to the original are only haltingly suggested in our forty or more copies, and we turn away disappointed. In the more sensuous Hellenistic era we catch a glimpse of something more the eternal feminine in the self-conscious *Capitoline Venus*. (The Venus in the Metropolitan is a charming version of the *Capitolene*.) She may be a little too much in the attitude of a fleeting moment to suit our taste in what is thought of as monumental sculpture, but she is certainly to be preferred to the badly restored and falsely idealized *Medici Venus*. Though less ideal than the *Knidian* and consequently less a goddess, she becomes more appealing to us as a beautiful creature on the human level. We are not much inclined to deal with goddesses.

Venus did not, however, remain embodied in cold marble. During the Renaissance she came to life in the warm sensuality of color and the illusory quality of painting. It is interesting that the painters who closely followed the classic ideal in the standing nude figure, found the pose too monumental for their medium of expression. It was a dead end street, first entered by Botticelli in his *Birth of Venus*, and one which at last frustrated the mighty Ingres with his *Venus Anadyomene* and *La Source*. A new concept was needed and it was found in the many variants of the reclining nude beginning with the *Sleeping Venus* by Giorgione, a distantly related reclining version of the *Knidian Venus*. The remote idealism suggested by the sightless marble eyes of the *Knidian* is carried over into the painting by the closed eyes of the sleeper. In this way the unself-conscious and impersonal qualities are deliberately retained.

It is more than likely that the same model who posed for Giorgione also posed for the *Venus of Urbino* by Titian. On the untimely death of Giorgione, Titian himself completed the painting of the sleeper, and not more than eight years later he added the *Urbino* to our gallery of Venuses. So much of the pose is so nearly identical that we might suggest simply that one was copied from the other. However, it is noticeable that all the features are a bit fuller—suggesting the same figure somewhat matured. Following a suggestion by C. J. Bulliet<sup>10</sup> it is not improbable that Eleanora Gonzaga, Duchess of Urbino, was the model for both paintings. Be that as it may, our Venus is now reclining on a bed with her eyes open and fixed upon us. The left hand is held in the half revealing Venus position while the face betrays no personal recognition whatever. In contrast with Giorgione's *Venus*, Titian's is vaguely unsatisfying, being neither classically idealized, nor personally animate.

From the seventeenth century through to the mid-nineteenth, the

10. *The Courtezan Olympia*, Covici, Friede, 1930.

painted concepts of the female nude were for the most part slick, impersonal, idealized creatures of doubtless admirable proportions, but little else to commend their monotonous posturing in imitation of classic statuary. The classic calm was finally shattered for all time, first by Goya near the turn of the nineteenth century with *La Maja Desnuda*, painted in the comparative solitude of Andalusia, and later by Manet at the Paris Salon in 1865 with his *Olympia*. Goya's Venus is most certainly a portrait of Dona Maria Theresa, Duchess of Alba. No goddess she—a more beautiful, enticing, sinful body has never been painted, and in the frank portrayal of personal lust, the artist has given us his moral judgment in his work. The artist was greater than the man. The Venus by Manet, a recognizable likeness of Berthe Morisot, is a descendant of the *Urbino Venus*, but by now the characterization left unresolved by Titian is settled irrevocably—any suspicion of classicism has disappeared. Venus, unredeemed, emerges as a vicious prostitute. Not in the history of art has there been painted such a profoundly disturbing likeness of the naked courtesan with her handsome, taunting impudence.

Since Manet, there have been many other paintings of the nude produced which have a considerable degree of merit and significance, from the dancers and bathers by Degas to the water color goddesses of Russell Flint. But, we have been dealing with masterpieces and one masterpiece is missing. Where is the *Venus Redeemed*, the radiantly lovely bride of the *Song of Songs*?

## A NEW THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

WILLIAM T. BRUNER

One of the greatest stumbling blocks to faith is the doctrine of original sin. The fact that children are born in sin is repulsive to our sensibilities; yet it cannot be denied by any one who accepts the Bible as the inspired Word of God. David says: "Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity; And in sin did my mother conceive me" (Psalm 51: 5); and, "The wicked are estranged from the womb: They go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies" (Psalm 58: 3).

The question that bothers people is this: How can a child be held responsible for a sin that he was born with? How can he be blamed for giving expression to his sinful nature when that is the only nature he has? And this leads to a further inquiry: How can the transgression of one man who lived at least six millenniums ago make us sinners today? Was I born in

Adam's sin and am I responsible for it? If I inherited a sinful inclination from another man, it would seem to make me a helpless, irresponsible victim of heredity and not actually guilty or justly liable to punishment. As one popular evangelist has put it, "You are not a sinner because you sin; you sin because you are a sinner." But the natural question in everybody's mind would be, "Who made me a sinner?"

Any effort to reason this problem through must inevitably lead us back to a question concerning the moral character of God. How could a good and loving Lord permit a child to be born under such a fatal handicap? Or if, as many claim, every new-born infant soul is a direct creation of the Almighty, how can we reconcile the holiness of God with the fact that He makes children sinful? Or if He creates them sinless and then thrusts them into sinful bodies, does not that amount to the same thing?

#### *Traditional Theories of Original Sin*

Space does not permit more than the barest outline of the principal theories of the imputation of Adam's sin to the race. All of these, except the Federal Headship theory, are based upon the idea that the sinful or corrupt nature of Adam can be transmitted to his offspring by the laws of heredity. And all of them represent the children as shut up to a life of sin because of another man's sin, through circumstances over which they have no control.

1. *The Augustinian Theory.* The whole race sinned *in* Adam, its natural head. Adam's nature was our nature; his will was our will; therefore, when he sinned he made our natures corrupt. We all participated in Adam's sin, not as conscious persons, but as seeds, just as the Levites paid tithes to Melchizedek when they were yet in their father Abraham's loins. Adam's nature was afterwards distributed or individualized into millions of separate persons, each one of us being guilty of his original sin and inheriting his sinful nature.

2. *The Semi-Pelagian Theory.* Sinful nature is inherited but without guilt. The Arminian revision of this theory teaches that the child is not guilty until he voluntarily appropriates the sinful nature that he derives from Adam. As a matter of fact, however, all children do appropriate this inherited corruption, which is so strong and so intimately bound up in his very life that he cannot escape from it.

3. *The Placean Theory.* Sinful nature is inherited and consequently imputed to us. This is the theory of Mediate Imputation, or condemnation for depravity. First we inherit inbred sin and then we are condemned for having it.

4. *The New School Theory.* Depravity is inherited and is of the nature of sin but is not actually sin, though it invariably leads to sin. It is an uncondemnable vitiosity. The will at birth is free; it has no moral character,

no bias toward sin until it acts. Nothing but an actual choice of the will can be called sin. All sin, then, consists in sinning. But when the child's will does act, it invariably chooses according to the inherited sinful predisposition of the soul's vitiated nature and thus becomes a sinful will.

5. *The Federal Headship of Adam Theory.* God appointed the first man the representative of the race and then charged his sin up to all his children. This is Immediate Imputation. Sin is first imputed and consequently sinful nature is inherited. Thus we are held guilty of a sin that we did not actually or personally commit. We sinned by proxy but are condemned in person. This theory is grounded in an absolute conception of the sovereign rights of God.

#### *The Ethical Principle*

Before we can proceed farther with our inquiry we must lay down the principles upon which our study is to be based. Inasmuch as our subject is the Christian doctrine of sin, we are concerned primarily with ethics rather than with metaphysics. Our appeal is therefore not so much to God's power and sovereignty as to His moral character. The most fundamental of God's moral attributes is His *holiness*. Inseparably bound up with this are His love and truth. We take our stand firmly upon the conviction that a holy and righteous God cannot sin. From this ethical principle, the *Holiness of God*, we deduce the following conclusions: God is not in any sense the author of sin. Neither can he create anything sinful or unholy. Nor can He cause any of His creatures to sin or be sinful. He can, and often does, provoke sinful beings to give outward or inward expression to their sinful nature, but He is not responsible for their being or remaining in their unholy condition. In short, God and sin are diametrically and absolutely opposed to each other, and every sinful condition is contrary to His holy will.

Applying these conclusions to the problem of original sin, we may now formulate our principle as follows: A holy Sovereign cannot impute guilt or inflict depravity upon any person who has not, by his own deliberate choice, made himself a transgressor. Nor is it possible for any power less than God to do so. In other words, my sin is absolutely my own, and I cannot hold anyone else responsible for it. Upon this ethical principle we shall now endeavor to construct a new theory which will be more reasonable, more scientific, and more Scriptural.

#### *What Is Sin?*

Another approach to the question of whether or not sin can be transmitted or transimputed lies in a consideration of the nature of sin. "Sin is the transgression of the law" (1 John 3:4, AV); or "Sin is lawlessness" (ARV). The original sin of Adam and Eve was an act of free will, a deliberate, conscious wrong choice, a positive disobedience of a known commandment, a rebellion against God. The transgressors were both per-

sonally guilty and consequently liable to the infliction of a just penalty. The result was spiritual death, and this involved, among other things, a sinful, corrupt, totally depraved nature; that is, an ungodly disposition of will, thought, and feeling.

Now the question is, Can a sinful nature be separated from sin? This must be possible if a person who has never sinned can be born with a sinful nature. We must beware here lest we fall into logical abstractions and obscure the whole matter. The whiteness of a piece of chalk, or any other quality that it possesses, can be logically abstracted from the chalk substance that bears it, but that does not mean that the chalk's whiteness can exist apart from the chalk. Likewise, human nature cannot exist apart from the particular human beings whose nature it is. A man's will can never exist apart from the man. Will, thought, and feeling are the faculties of personality, and no one of these three functions can exist apart from an actual concrete person. A man's will is never exercised except in connection with his thoughts and feelings. When Augustine taught that my nature existed and sinned in another man long before I came into existence, he was allowing his philosophy to lead him into the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

Nothing but a person can sin or be sinful or guilty. A nature is nothing but the quality of a person and therefore cannot sin apart from the particular person whose nature it is. Sin is an act of the will and always necessarily involves the person's thoughts and feelings. And if all three of these faculties are present, the person himself is present. Therefore, if I sinned in Adam, my will, thoughts, and feelings sinned in Adam, and this means that my personality was present in Adam. But personality itself is only the quality of being a person. Therefore, when I sinned in Adam, I was not just a seed but an actual, living, conscious person. This would mean that I myself was actually living at the time when Adam sinned in the Garden of Eden. If my original sin was a "transgression of the law," I must have been present right there, intelligent, conscious, and fully aware of what I was doing. But if this is true, the question arises, What was my relation to Adam? Was I actually *in* Adam, as Augustine claims? That would mean a person within a person. But the Bible nowhere says that we "*sinned in Adam*"; it only says that we *die in Adam* (1 Cor. 15: 22). There was only one man in existence when Adam sinned. This would seem to indicate that when I committed my original sin I *was* Adam. How could I be guilty of Adam's transgression or be born with his sinful nature unless I were Adam? And yet could I be another man?

It is a significant fact that the Bible never speaks of a sinful nature apart from sin. In fact, the term "sinful nature" is not once found in the Bible. It is a logical abstraction that we are in the habit of reading into the Scriptures. David does not say, "In a sinful nature did my mother conceive

me," he calls it sin. Both logically and ethically it is impossible to separate sinful nature from actual sin. Nobody can have a sinful nature without being sinful, for it is certainly a sin to have such a nature. Instead of saying, therefore, that the child sins because he has a sinful nature, we should say that he has a sinful nature because he sinned. But this would seem to drive us to the conclusion that the baby sinned before he was born. Many will no doubt be shocked at such a statement. And yet is this any more repulsive than to say that the holy and righteous and loving Lord made the baby a sinner? The laws of heredity are God's laws. Can we really conceive of such a God inflicting a sinful or depraved or vitiated nature upon a helpless, unconscious, irresponsible infant who has never done anything to make himself worthy of such a curse?

Another little known fact is that the Bible nowhere indicates that sin or sinful nature is inherited. Physical and mental characteristics are recognized as transmitted through the laws of biological heredity, but this never applies to moral choices and dispositions. In passages like Exodus 20: 5f. and 34: 7, where Jehovah visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generations, the idea is simply that the sin of the parents naturally brings calamity upon the children. The innocent suffer with the guilty. But there is no suggestion that the parents' sin or guilt or even their wicked nature is transmitted to their children. It is true also that the children of ungodly parents usually follow in their footsteps, but this is simply social heredity, not biological. Moral and spiritual traits are learned, not inherited. The children of saints and sinners are alike born in sin, but in the latter case there is less influence of saving grace to turn them away from their evil ways. On the other hand, there are a number of Scriptures, such as Deut. 24: 16; 2 Kings 14: 6; Jer. 31: 29f.; and Ezek. 18: 2-20, which teach that children are not guilty of their parents' sins and are not to be punished for them.

The Bible doctrine of sin now appears in a much clearer light. Sin is not a physical thing; it is not a substance, a force, a disease, a taint, an affliction, a weakness, a disability, or a punishment. It is not a negation or an absence of something; nor is it a mistake or an error. Sin is not even a mental trait; it is purely spiritual and personal. Hence it is not subject to the laws of heredity. In fact, sin is not subject to any law; it is a law unto itself (Rom. 7: 23).

It can now be laid down as a moral axiom that sin is strictly a personal and spiritual matter. Each person's sin is exclusively his own, and he alone is to blame for it. Neither sin, predisposition to sin, nor guilt can be transmitted, inherited, or transimputed from one person to another. No one can become a sinner in any other way than by his own free, moral, personal, conscious volition. Each child is born in his own sin and guilt.

God imputes original sin to me because I am literally an original sinner. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that we sinned before we were born. And this means that we each had a self-conscious, personal, active existence somewhere, some time, before we were born.

### *The Meaning of Romans 5:12*

We are now prepared to examine one of the most misunderstood texts in the whole Bible. "Therefore, as through ONE MAN sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto ALL MEN, for that ALL SINNED: —" (Rom. 5: 12. *Capitals mine*).

We must be careful to refrain from reading into these words any preconceived theories. Paul does not say that men inherited a sinful nature; he declares that "ALL SINNED." Neither does he say that the sin or guilt of any other person was imputed to them. Nothing is said about a sinful, corrupt, or vitiated nature; only sin is mentioned. The obvious implication is that ALL MEN died because ALL MEN sinned, and this would normally suggest that each man died for his own sin. And yet the verse starts out by saying that death entered the world because ONE MAN sinned.

Now the great problem of this verse is, What is the connection between the ALL MEN and the ONE MAN? It does not say that the ALL MEN died because the ONE MAN sinned but that they ALL SINNED. Does it mean that they ALL SINNED *because* the ONE MAN sinned? That is, did they become sinners because of his influence or his example or some proneness to sin that he caused them to have? There are at least two considerations that forbid this conclusion. In verse 18 Paul says: "So then, as through ONE TRESPASS the *judgment* came unto all men to condemnation; even so through one act of righteousness the *free gift* came unto all men to justification of life." The first half of this verse, if it stood alone, might be taken to mean that the first man's trespass caused the men who followed him to commit *similar* trespasses that resulted in their condemnation. But this would seem to call for a like interpretation of the second half of the verse, which is parallel to it, and this would mean that one act of righteousness that Christ did caused those who follow Him to do similar works of righteousness which resulted in their justification. This would be justification by works; but the true doctrine is that the works of Christ are imputed to us because we have identified ourselves with Him by faith. The most natural meaning of the words is that ALL MEN are condemned immediately because of the ONE TRESPASS of the ONE MAN, just as they are justified immediately because of the one act of righteousness of Christ.

The second consideration that forbids our concluding that the ALL MEN sinned merely because the ONE MAN sinned is the fact that a great many persons suffer the wages of sin (which is death) who have never sinned since they were born. Infants and idiots are included in this num-

ber. "Nevertheless death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression" (verse 14). Now it is plain that babies and idiots, as well as all others who lived before the Mosaic law was given, were included among the ALL MEN who sinned. But what law did they transgress to receive the death penalty? The law of Moses is, of course, ruled out, for they could not be guilty of a law that they did not have. The fundamental moral law was in the world, written on their hearts, and those who were old enough to know good from evil were condemned for breaking it. But what about infants and idiots, who knew no law at all? They die just as surely as the rest. Verse 4 says expressly that they did not commit a sin *similar* to Adam's transgression (after the likeness of it). Yet they must have committed some kind of sin, for verse 12 says that ALL SINNED. Besides the Mosaic law and the moral law that is written on the heart there is only one other law known to us, and that is the probationary statute that was given to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden (Gen. 2: 17). We conclude, therefore, that they committed not a *similar* transgression but the same *identical* transgression that Adam committed, which was the ONE TRESPASS of verse 18. But only ONE MAN committed the original sin; therefore they were all the same *identical* person as Adam.

Verse 12 starts out with ONE MAN and ends with ALL SINNED. We therefore infer that the ONE MAN and the ALL MEN are one and the same man. The doctrine of original sin that is taught in this text may be stated as follows: "ALL SINNED when ALL MEN were ONE MAN—through ONE TRESPASS."

#### *The Unity and Diversity of Adam's Race*

Our theory may be stated in these terms: We were all one person when we were created. The whole human race had one body, one soul, one mind, one will, one consciousness, one personality, one self. Each one of us knew himself as one individual, the self-same person that he is today, and yet we all knew ourselves as Adam. We cannot remember that far back, for our memories are very imperfect and have faded out. None of us can remember the first sin we committed in our childhood; indeed, we would be appalled if we should suddenly recall all the wrong things we have ever done. It is not surprising, therefore, if we cannot remember the time when we put forth our hand and plucked the forbidden fruit and fell from our state of innocence. Nevertheless all the experiences we have ever had, all the deeds we have ever done, all the thoughts that have ever been in our minds are still stored up in our subconscious minds. At the final judgment we may expect all these memories to be revived, including the original sin.

It has been said that the total mind of a man is like an iceberg, the

greater part of which is submerged in the ocean, with only a small fraction of it appearing above the surface. Thus the conscious part of the mind is only a tiny part of the whole. If we could dig down deep enough into this vast subliminal depository, we should find that it is the mind of Adam and is also the common subconscious mind of all the human beings who have ever lived. All individual persons are like islands in a great archipelago, each being isolated from the others by the intervening ocean of forgetfulness but connected underneath by the one huge land-mass of common racial experience. Or it may be compared to a great mass of coral, or a tree, whose branches grow out in many directions.

The principle of individuation of the human race is the dissolving of the memory bond that originally bound our mental and emotional life together as one system of consciousness. This splitting of the personality, or dissociation, is well known in psychology. Quite recently Dr. Corbett H. Thigpen and Dr. Harvey M. Cleckley, in their book, *The Three Faces of Eve*, have described a woman whose personality split into "three women in one body." Each one had her own distinctive mental and character traits and considered herself a complete person. Now if these three women could somehow have developed separate bodies, they could apparently have lived out their lives just as independently as though they had come into the world by separate births.

This gives us a clue to the origin of souls. It has long been assumed that the conception and birth of children is primarily a physical process, the body separating from the parents' bodies and the soul from their souls by natural generation (traducianism). Or else the child's soul is created separately and put into the body (creationism). And yet most people admit that man is primarily a spiritual being and not an animal. It would seem that the primary factor in reproduction ought to be the soul, or personality rather than the body. Now according to our new conception, the unity of Adam's race is spiritual and personal and not merely physical and biological. All individuals of the race are simply dissociated selves or multiple personalities of the original Adam. It is the soul that builds up the body. Working on the lower and unconscious plane its activities constitute the life processes of the physical man; on the higher and conscious plane it expresses itself in the faculties of personality: will, thought, and feeling.

If this personalistic conception of the unity of the race is true, we have at last an adequate explanation of the fact that children are born in original sin and total depravity. We are simply fragments or islands of Adam's constantly dissociating personality. And if we are the same person as the original sinner, we are still guilty of his transgression.

#### *The Fall of Man*

Before man sinned he was holy, innocent, and happy. There were

no doubts or selfish interests to mar his fellowship with God, and no emotional conflicts, warring passions, or mental confusions to destroy his peace of mind. But in the day that he disobeyed God he died. Death, for an immortal spirit, such as all persons are, does not mean ceasing to exist; it means separation, and this in three senses: spiritual, psychial, and physical.

1. *Spiritual death* is separation of the soul from God. The fellowship was broken, and man was now dead in trespasses and sins.

2. *Psychical death* is separation of the soul from itself. The personality is split, broken, or torn. Man is now at war with himself. Like a house divided against itself, his mind is distracted and torn to pieces by a thousand worries, fears, conflicting motives, unruly impulses, and surging passions, which exhaust his mental energy and wear out his life. Every instinct now rebels against resolution, reason, and conscience. He finds it hard to control his emotions, which, before the fall, were under the influence of the Holy Spirit. For this reason he has to wear clothes to hide his shame from himself and from others, for now it takes but a lustful look to rouse his passions to lawless activity. Man is like a captain who can scarcely restrain his mutinous crew, or a king whose disloyal subjects are continually breaking the royal law. And such is the picture of every child of Adam from that day to this. When this inward conflict becomes unbearably severe, man becomes a psychiatric case, and the result is multiple personalities, schizophrenia, and other psychopathic disorders.

3. *Physical death* is separation of the soul from the body. In its absolute stage the soul leaves the body entirely. But if the soul has been split, one dissociated self may continue to have normal use of the body while the others lose control of it. These latter may be said to be truly dead to the body, though still remaining in it. This is what happened to Adam the day he sinned and died. His consciousness was split. The great bulk of his once superb personality was driven down into the depths of his unconscious being. His subliminal self remained embedded in his physical organism, splitting again and again into innumerable discordant and unruly sub-selves. These, from time to time, managed to separate completely from his body and built up bodies of their own. Thus sons and daughters were born, of which there have been many millions. This explanation of death as a three-fold process going on within Adam's being gives a fuller meaning to Paul's remark in 1 Corinthians 15: 22: "For as in Adam all die."

The incarnated fragments of the old Adamic self are still at war with one another, just as they were in the disintegrating personality of their first father. The first child born was a murderer. If Adam had not sinned and incurred this spiritual, psychial, and physical death, he would still have dissociated himself into children, just as he does now, but it would have been a peaceful, orderly separation. They would not be hating and fighting one

another. The descendants of an unfallen Adam and Eve would have constituted a sinless human society, one great peaceful brotherhood, living in perfect harmony like the thoughts and emotions of a well-ordered, Spirit-filled mind.

But another question now arises. If Adam died the day he sinned, who was the Adam who continued to live in his body for 930 years? The only answer we can give is that God permitted a dissociated self of the Adam who died to remain alive for a limited time to propagate the race and accomplish God's purpose for him. This postlapsarian Adam was a pitiful, shrunken soul, a torn remnant of the wonderful man he used to be. And so are we all today.

### *Salvation from Sin*

In Romans 7: 14-25 Paul gives us a vivid portrayal of the divided self. Interpreters disagree as to whether this refers to an unconverted man or a Christian. The description of inward struggle could certainly fit either one, but I accept the latter view. In the case of the Christian the situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that a new self, born of the Holy Spirit, has come in to take up the warfare against the entire Adamic self-life. Conversion thus amounts to a fresh split in the personality. Paul speaks of two men: an *old man*, who is the old Adamic self, and a *new man*, who is a "new creature" (Rom. 6: 6; 2 Cor. 5: 17; Eph. 4: 22f.; Col. 3: 9f.). When the sinner repents he denies himself and takes up his cross. This means that he renounces his identity with the old man that he used to be and reckons him dead (Rom. 6: 1-11; Gal. 2: 20). At the same time he accepts Christ as his new life (Col. 3: 3f.). Thus he who was formerly, by substance, *identical* with the first man Adam now becomes, by faith, *identified* with the last Adam. By being crucified with Christ and raised with Him he comes under the benefits of His atoning death and His justifying resurrection. From this time on God no longer imputes to him his original sin but only the righteousness of His Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

## OBJECTIONS TO IDENTISTIC PERSONALISM

### *Answers to questions submitted by Dr. Roger Nicole.*

(1) If it be that mankind is the split personality of the original Adam, how can this be explained in terms of the multitude of bodies involved? All we know of split personalities is in the cases where one body is used by two or more personalities, and the connection is in terms of the unity of the body. If the bodies are different, it is not at all apparent how a split can exist.

Observation alone would never suggest that the many personalities existing in different bodies are split personalities of one original. The evidence is to be found in three fundamental principles: the primacy and originality of personality, the personal responsibility and guilt of sin, and the holy character of the Creator.

*Personality is the ultimate reality.* Everything else, including matter and motion, is merely an expression of personality and can have nothing more than a secondary or derivative existence. Personality, spirit, soul, mind, consciousness, self, and the ego are all one and the same entity looked at from different points of view and in different relationships. That the soul can operate at a distance from the body and even exist apart from all connection with it seems to be demonstrated by researches in parapsychology and by many strange psychic phenomena. On the strength of these facts, as well as upon the authority of Holy Scripture, it is not hard to believe that the soul is more original than the body and that, instead of being a product of the physical processes, it actually produces them. All the functions of the body, including reproduction, are really functions of the soul. This is true regardless of whether these processes be conscious, subconscious, or unconscious. Now if the soul has been split into two or more sub-selves, each one being sub-conscious with relation to the others, it is easy to see how these can take advantage of the sex functions to launch themselves into independent bodily existence. The germplasm, being undifferentiated tissue, is their peculiar abode. Just as the conscious mind expresses itself in thoughts, which operate in the brain, these subconscious selves express themselves in the genes or determiners of heredity, which build up the body and govern it. The genotypical constitution found in the germ cells is simply a dissociated personality that has not yet built up an organism through which it can establish a conscious relation to the rest of the world.

(2) Your view ought to be related more clearly to the work of Christ, and to the actual transfer of guilt to be observed in that work if the Biblical doctrine of the atonement is to be preserved. Furthermore, we may ask whether the humanity of Christ was also a splinter of the original Adam.

Again we appeal to three fundamental principles, this time the veracity of God, the personal identity of the punished and the guilty, and the immortality of the soul.

True and righteous are the judgments of God. He cannot misrepresent the facts. If He cannot impute guilt to those who have not personally sinned or assumed guilt, it stands to reason that He likewise cannot impute righteousness to those who are not righteous. The doctrine of justification by faith has been misrepresented by those who read a false parallelism into Romans 5: 12-21. It is true that the verb *dikaioo* means "to declare righteous," but this does not imply a fictitious imputation. God declares the penitent sinner righteous because he actually is righteous. That is, he becomes *righteous by faith*, though not yet by practice. Likewise, when God transfers the guilt of fallen humanity to the innocent Christ, it would seem to imply that Christ was actually guilty in some sense. In what way did Christ take the guilt upon Himself? Or did He?

Christ had to become a man for two reasons, to fulfill the law which

man broke and to pay the penalty for man's guilt. Man must die for man's transgression. Now this presents an intricate problem. The God-man must not be partly God and partly man but fully both. At the same time the divine nature and the human nature must remain distinct and unchanged. Neither must be absorbed or transmuted into the other, nor could the two be fused into a *tertium quid*, for that would be neither human nor divine. Nor would it do for the two natures to remain simply associated together, however closely, for that would not be God *becoming* man. The traditional orthodox view (Chalcedon, 451 A.D.) attempts to solve this problem by assuming that the divine Person took upon Himself human nature in addition to his divine nature. Thus there was one Person having two natures. See Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, pp. 390f.

There is a glaring defect in the Chalcedonian theory. If Jesus had no human personality, how could He be truly human? He would have been *similar* to man but not actually a complete man. Human nature apart from a human personality, to which alone it can belong, is only an abstraction. It is human nature to be a person but not a divine person. It was therefore necessary for the Lord to have two complete personalities, divine and human.

But this conclusion seems to lead us back to the old Nestorian heresy. And we admit that Christ must have *one* personality. This means that the two personalities must somehow become integrated into one, yet without amalgamating into something that was neither human nor divine. Here is where Identistic Personalism comes in with a new view of the incarnation.

All that we know about personality may be conceived activistically, under the categories of the three familiar faculties of will, thought, and feeling. If the substance of the ego consists of anything besides these, we do not know what it is. Indeed, all reality may be explained in terms of these three expressions or functions of a person. Will, thought, and feeling are, respectively, the active, formal, and passive aspects of all reality. The splitting of a personality may be described as follows: The will divides into two wills, the thought into two thoughts, and the feeling into two feelings. The result is two consciousnesses, two selves, two egos, two persons. The two will still have the same past, but their present and future careers are as different individuals.

Now by reversing the process two persons may become one person. When two wills will the same, they become one will. So also the two minds think the same and become one mind. This includes reason, imagination, and every other intellectual faculty. At the same time their emotions and sensibilities feel the same, so that they have the same identical consciousness. In this way appropriates the other as its own self, and the two become one self. Their pasts, of course, will continue to be different, because what is past is already done for all time. Persons who have separate bodies cannot

become numerically one with each other, though they may go a long way toward achieving a practical identity, by mutual agreement, cooperation, sympathy, and love. Physical bodies can never occupy the same space at the same time, but this is not true of spirits, which have no such spatial limitations.

When Christ became man to make the atonement He had to become the same man who sinned. If God had created a new man, he would have been no kin to us. So the divine Logos reawakened the old prelapsarian Adam, who was still a present reality existing in the womb of Mary. Because both were sinless there was nothing to hinder them from appropriating each other and identifying themselves as one person. Each willed the other's will, thought the other's thought, and felt the other's emotions, the two thereby becoming one self-consciousness, one self. This was a free, voluntary, personal, dynamic, internal unity, neither one forcing or overpowering the other. Each was free to break the unity at any time; yet so complete was the agreement that they were as truly one as though they had never been different persons. During His lifetime Jesus never knew the internal mental and emotional conflicts that confuse other men's souls.

(3) How is Eve related to this whole situation? Was she a split from Adam from the viewpoint of personality? If so, the splintering started before the fall. If not, where does she fit in?

Eve was the first dissociated self of Adam. She had a soul, but the Scripture nowhere says that God breathed into her the breath of life as He did into Adam. The narrative is extremely brief and is told in the language of external appearances. We may infer, therefore, that, just as the woman's body was derived from the man's, her personality was likewise a split from his (Gen. 2: 23; 1 Cor. 11: 8f.). Paul's statement, "God made of one every nation of men" (Acts 17: 26), evidently refers to soul as well as body.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*The Court and the Castle*, by Rebecca West. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. 319 pp.

In his classic on English prose style, Sir Herbert Read speaks of "that rare intellectual delectation which comes from the sense of surprise and satisfaction which we experience in finding so many discrete facts subsumed under one theory." Something of this delectation comes in the reading of Miss West's latest book. The theological doctrine of the inherited depravity of the human race, a running commentary on Shakespeare and on changing attitudes in the English novel from Fielding to Joyce, with Proust and Kafka thrown in as modern Continental exhibits, the recurrent awareness that

"power corrupts," of which Lord Acton was no more fully cognizant than our Senate and House investigating subcommittees of the fifties, the shift in the distribution of social and political power from feudalism to the present, and problems of free will and bondage, rightful authority and usurpation — all are woven together in this masterful study.

The delectation is rarer as it might be, though, for Miss West's beautiful and powerful prose is marred by a tendency all too common in our day, to place a burden of objective exposition upon words charged with subjective associations and symbolisms. "Court" and "castle," masquerading as everyday words, are really characters in a private code. Too often the reader is faced with the task of deciphering them and of making transitions which were inadvisedly left implicit.

Miss West attacks the common interpretation of Hamlet as an intellectual who remains irresolute because he cannot commit himself to "the coarseness of action." The error, she says, stems from men's reluctance to accept distasteful truths about their own nature as revealed by an artist. They prefer to repress them and "pretend that he wrote something quite other than what he did." The central fact about Hamlet is not the weakness of his will but its corruption. "What excites Shakespeare in this play is the impossibility of conceiving an action which could justly be termed virtuous, in view of the bias of original sin" (28). Miss West feels that this re-reading restores *Hamlet* and Shakespeare to the main stream of world literature which has dealt with the theme of the essential goodness vs. the essential vileness of man.

It also places him in the tradition of the literary treatment of man as a being with social and political propensities. Though a bad man, Hamlet is a good prince. Because of original sin this contradiction cannot be avoided. To uphold political one must violate personal morality, as illustrated by *Richard II*, *Henry IV*, and Machiavelli. The other alternative, shown in *Measure for Measure* and *The Tempest*, is to abdicate the responsibility and "the guilt of royalty", but even this is immoral because it threatens the state by allowing the usurper to enter. And the usurper, even though beginning as a good man (Bolingbroke) freeing society from a tyrant, is soon corrupted by the power he assumes. Here we are plunged into Renaissance and especially English controversies on the source of the king's authority and the justification of revolt.

Miss West then proceeds to conjecture that the king may be a symbol for the human will, and the Shakespeare may be talking not politically but theologically. Either way, Shakespeare emerges as an anti-Pelagian; as for *Hamlet*, "there are echoes of Calvin's voice all through" (75). It is this verdict on man's nature which subsequent criticism has chosen to misread rather than accept.

Miss West turns to the English novelists. Fielding, Emily Bronte, Scott, Austen, Dickens, Thackeray — she finds them all aware, with Shakespeare, of the corruption of man as seen in society. Through the shift of government from monarchy to the aristocracy of the Walpole era to a growing democracy, the corruption remains. These writers differ from Shakespeare, however, in their optimistic and Pelagian trust in the uncorrupted human will. The individual's values were sound; it was the necessity of compromise with the false values of Society which was the source of evil, according to these writers. Miss West concludes that since Society in the nineteenth century occupied the position of authority comparable to the King in the sixteenth, the problem of Austen's and Thackeray's and Troope's characters is much the same as that of *Hamlet*.

The scene shifts to the transition figures: Meredith, Hardy, Galsworthy, Wells. Authority was shifting once again, this time from the rotting capitalist and ecclesiastical bureaucracy to the women and the workmen of Ibsen's plays. And by the time of the modern era the democratic and Pelagian traditions have reached a dead end. There is a return in Conrad to the social compact of Shakespeare's day in which one man (on shipboard now as a symbol) is given absolute power, together with which he accepts absolute responsibility. Proist reflects this century's growing realization of man's evil nature, but is much weaker than Shakespeare because he falls short of realism in portraying his characters. Kafka is in one sense even more lacking, having no capacity at all for character analysis; yet his trial court and his castle, while on one level a satire on bureaucracy, are also religious allegories (289ff.). As such, their theme is sin and guilt, not only the corruption of society, which has been recognized all along, but also of the individual — and we are back once again with *Hamlet* and Calvin.

Unfortunately, the author has tried to write two books in one. The thread of her stimulating argument is frequently interrupted by *obiter dicta* on a wide variety of irrelevancies. Collected separately in a book of another sort these would make delightful reading, but here they only divert the reader's attention from the main theme, and both layers suffer.

— Charles A. Hutter

*Shakespearean Tragedy and the Elizabethan Compromise*, by Paul N. Siegel. New York: New York University Press, 1957. 188 + 55 pp. \$5.00.

A welcome complement to the sort of criticism which looks at a play only as a *ding an sich* is that which recognizes in the greatest literature a vital connection with contemporary thought and life. Such an approach is particularly appropriate for a literary phenomenon so intimately related to its times as the Elizabethan stage. The undertaking calls for an author who is something of an historian, economist, and theologian in addition to being

a perceptive reader and critic. Mr. Siegel, head of the English Department at Long Island University, has little original to offer in the analysis of Elizabethan society which makes up the first and smaller of his two parts, but his exposition is clear and interesting. The second part, in which a general chapter on Shakespearean tragedy is followed by individual treatments of *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *Macbeth*, and *Lear*, shows evidence of careful reading of the texts, judicious juxtaposition of key words and images, and imaginative recreations of associations, lost to us, which the plays must have called forth in Elizabethan minds.

At the time in which Shakespeare wrote, says Mr. Siegel, opposite tendencies were present in the arts and in society. In the latter, the power balance among the old nobility, the new nobility, and the merchant class was falling apart because of growing mercantile wealth following the defeat of the Spanish Armada. The same event also led to a strengthening of the Puritans and a consequent dissolution of the religious coalition which Elizabeth had maintained for half her reign. But at this time when the old order was collapsing, a great literature largely defending the old order was blossoming. The Anglican compromise had evolved the position of "Christian humanism," and when after 1588 men like Marlowe wanted to delete the word "Christian" and others like the Brownists wanted to delete the word "humanism," Shakespearean tragedy appeared as a powerful statement of Christian humanism.

The viewpoint espoused in this book is that "Shakespeare, in keeping with the Christian humanist world view, shows man as part of a divine scheme of things the details of whose workings are beyond human ken but on whose general laws human beings may rely" (83). The tragedies are in the Humanist tradition because their focus is on man, as it must necessarily be to have tragedy (91): The divine, if present at all, must remain in the background, or you have, with Dante, comedy. But they are also "explicitly Christian"—and here Siegel goes beyond "A. C. Bradley's remarkable analysis," which he quotes approvingly, to add these four points:

- (1) Shakespearean tragedy conveys a sense of divine providence; (2) this divine providence visits a poetically appropriate retribution upon the guilty; (3) characters and action suggest analogies with the Bible story; (4) there are intimations of the heaven and hell of Christian religion.

Thus Laertes, Macbeth, and Edmund are not ordinarily villains, but explicitly the type of the non-Christian humanist: Laertes the corrupt Italianate, Macbeth the Machiavellian, Edmund the avowed atheist (Yet nowhere is Providence more clearly stated than by the dying Edmund: *Lear*, V, iii, 170-72). Othello, forsaking the Christian ideals, virtually sells his soul to the devil incarnate in Iago. There are besides Iago many other reflections of the characters of the Bible story. The temptress Eve is reflected in Lady Macbeth; Othello, remorseful as he looks on the dead Desdemona but in-

capable or repentance or salvation, continues his parallel with Judas; and both Desdemona, pure in her resistance to temptation, and Cordelia, at whose innocent death Lear finally finds redemption, would, by Elizabethan audiences, be partially identified with Christ. The Christian after-life is also part of the backdrop of these plays. "Flights of angels sing thee to thy rest," Horatio prays at Hamlet's death; Lear's childish evocation of the pleasures he and Cordelia will enjoy takes on a prophetic note as they are united in death; and early in his downward course (III, i, 65-69) Macbeth recognizes the hell which awaits him. Here Shakespeare is close to the explicit Christian ending of the morality plays; but in each case he returns to the human scene, and the plays end with Fortinbras, Albany, and Malcolm, and the hope of a future governed by Christian ideals. — Charles A. Hutter

*Segregation and the Bible*, by Everett Tilson. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958. 176 pp. \$2.50.

Written at a time when racial tensions run high, *Segregation and the Bible* endeavors to present a searching Scriptural study leading to a sound approach to the segregation-integration controversy current in our American society. Dr. Tilson does this by asking three vital questions: Does the Bible demand segregation? Are there biblical precedents for segregation? What are the implications of basic biblical faith for the Christian approach to the problem?

The author begins by demonstrating that the proof text method of establishing biblical evidence is faulty. Segregationists hold Genesis 19 as the basis of the divine origin of the separation of the races. Genesis, however, does not claim that Japhet, Shem and Ham are the progenitors of distinct racial groups. Reliable Bible scholars show that the author of this narrative never intended to give an account of the separation of men on the basis of physical characteristics. Likewise, the reference to Genesis II where the confusion of tongues is alleged to be a penalty for man's attempt at racial integration is faulty. This passage offers little substantiation for this contention because the Lord does not punish mankind at Babel for its attempted integration of the human race, but for its attempted 'integration' of God and man. In connection with this same question, segregationists cite the Levitical prohibition (Lev. 19:19) against mixtures as evidence against segregation. This allegation is very weak because it draws its conclusions about human relations on the basis of a biblical statement about cattle. The argument for racial purity as a requirement of God also has a faulty conclusion. The demand for a pure Israel was not a demand for a pure race. During the period between the Exodus and the Exile the prophets condemned association with the Canaanites on the grounds of culture and religion and not on racial connotations. The separatist move-

ment of Nehemiah and Ezra carried on later was based upon reasons other than racial. To be sure, these prophets prohibited mixed marriages because of the corruption of Jewish faith and worship caused by intermarriage. Their primary concern was religious and not racial purity. The books of Ruth and Jonah are powerful criticisms of any racial exclusivism.

On the question of precedents for segregation, the study is carried on the basis of the doctrine of a limited brotherhood, the particularism of Jesus and the example of the Apostles. With respect to the brotherhood, the New Testament supplies neither argument nor precedent for the restriction of membership on racial grounds. The separatist tendencies ascribed to Jesus in the healing of the Syrophenician woman, the Matthean version of the charge to the twelve, and the discipline to be followed with disaffected members of the Christian community, do not warrant any exclusivist segregation on racial lines. In the Syrophenician case, Jesus grants the woman's request. Here Jesus did respond to Gentile faith. In the missionary charge, Jesus was aware of the shortness of time, therefore, he must make his message clear to those around him. This exclusion was not in terms of racialism but due to the shortness of time. Jesus' statement with respect to the case on discipline is not to be construed as an argument for segregation but as an admonition against association with cantankerous Christians. In teaching the love of God for all mankind, Jesus and the Apostles did away with any invidious and preferential treatment in terms of race.

With respect to the relevance of the Bible for a Christian approach to segregation, Dr. Tilson suggests that the Bible provides little assurance to persons who seek guiding principles for the implementation of integration or segregation. There are, however, certain ethical and theological considerations in the Bible which are most relevant to the problem of race. Paramount among these is the character and purpose of God. God is the creator of all. Biblical stress on God's work as creator, redeemer and judge points man to the severe limits of human action, but God's role as Lord of history accentuates the crucial significance of human actions. There is no place for human arrogance neither is there place for human irresponsibility. We must choose to do the right. We have freedom of purpose for ourselves and our society. If segregation is wrong, we must bear the responsibility of a segregated society. Significantly important is the biblical view of man as a creature of dignity. Men are seen as equals not because of achievements of any kind but because all men are equally dependent upon God. Biblical writers see in each generation God's opportunity for a new start, not because all generations are equally good or bad but because God so controls history as to reconcile His divine sovereignty and human freedom.

This book is highly recommended not only to serious-minded Bible

students but also to students of sociology. I do not know of any work written in recent years that stimulates so profound a degree of professional self-analysis on a burning issue. This is as remarkable as it is healthy.

—Samuel M. Ortegon

*Marx Meets Christ*, by Frank Wilson Price. Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1957. 176 pp. \$3.50.

The contents of this book may come as a surprise to those who know Dr. Price's long history of conservative Christian theological conviction and his enthusiastic support of Chiang Kai-shek and active participation in the war in China in the late 1940's as well as hardships suffered at the hands of the Chinese Communists during the years prior to his release from China in 1952. One might well expect the kind of vitriolic, bitter and sweeping condemnation of Marxism and all its works which has become popular among evangelical Christians in recent years.

It has taken courage for the author not to follow the popular pattern but to try instead to fulfill the command of Christ to love his enemy. There is nowhere in the book a trace of the bitterness one might expect. Instead there is an amazing fairness in his treatment of Marx the man (whom he compares with Jesus the man in a most serious and constructive manner), and of Marxism as an idea, a system, and a faith. In each part of the book he compares Christianity with Marxism in a way which is as objective as an honest Christian can achieve. That is, he holds ever before himself the challenge he once gave to a young Chinese Communist, "In spite of our differences, we both face Jesus Christ. He says to us both, 'Follow me'" (162) Dr. Price concludes that in some respects the Marxist has come closer to following Christ than has the Christian.

Dr. Price is not ignorant of the personal danger in taking this line. He quotes Paul Tillich: "His (Karl Marx') name has become so potent a political and semireligious symbol, divine or demonic, that whatever you say about him will be used against you by both sides." He even has the courage to criticize the bitter anticomunism of a "considerable body of American Christian business and professional men who have little understanding of the forces producing social change." He counters with his own statement of an "evangelical" approach to Marxism (161ff).

And Dr. Price's approach is not only evangelical, but evangelistic. Throughout the book it is obvious that he loves the Marxist because Christ loves him and has commanded that the Gospel be preached to him. He is able to disagree strongly, unequivocally, and fundamentally with both Marxists and fellow Christians in both Right and Left-wing camps without ever losing the gentleness of the shepherd who has been commanded to seek and to save that which is lost. Frank Price does not want the Marxist destroyed,

he wants him saved. Because he wants him saved, he wants to understand him. Furthermore, because this desire grows out of his allegiance to the sovereignty of God (Price is a Presbyterian), he is also willing to hear what God may be saying to His people through the Marxist.

One inadequacy exists in this book which could have been remedied without increasing its bulk critically. There is no detailed or exact analysis of the Marxist economy theory nor of the very detailed biblical economics of Leviticus and Deuteronomy. Nor does the author seem to have noticed that the Psalmist almost equates "the poor" and "the righteous." There is a strong class content in the Bible (over 380 references to the poor and oppressed!) which Dr. Price has not adequately evaluated for the type of comparison he is making.

This book can be equally useful whether given to Marxists or Christians. It should command respect in both camps. — *Archer Torrey*

*The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870*, by Walter E. Houghton. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. xvii + 467 pp., including bibliography and index. \$6.00.

To those for whom "Victorian" still means a sentimental, complacent, prudish bent of mind, this work will expose a popular fallacy. And for readers who are sufficiently acquainted with recent scholarship on the period to be aware of this fallacy, Professor Houghton's study will show how tremendously complex and paradoxical was the Victorian climate of thought. His book succeeds admirably in exploring the many ambivalences of an age which hovered between idealism and mechanism, between earnest intellectualism and Philistine indifference to culture, between faith in corporate authority and "laissez faire" individualism.

As a literary scholar (and professor at Wellesley College), the author naturally takes into account the well-known literary documents of the time but he bases his study largely on letters, diaries, sermons and on little-known works by major and minor writers of the period. He avoids concentrating on "isms" themselves in an effort to get at "those general ideas and attitudes about life which a Victorian of the middle and upper classes would have breathed in with the air." Just how did the Victorians think; can we get through the blur of time and see them as they really were?

This the author seeks to do, with compendious information, with careful qualification, and at times with the concreteness of a Kinsey report. Though he does not succumb to that common ailment among literary scholars, "period-apologitis," his approach is nevertheless sympathetic. He shows how to some extent Victorian prudery and earnestness may be seen as a reaction (inspired by both the Romantic and Evangelical movements) against the flippancy and immorality of the Regency period. He considers

such attitudes as Victorian hero-worship, their concept of marriage, and the causes for their oft-alleged hypocrisy. Any sampling of the book's material here would be purely arbitrary, depending on one's interest. Its coverage is quite comprehensive, though some will think the author's arrangement too schematic (the 14 chapters bear such titles as "Anxiety," "Rigidity," "The Worship of Force," "Enthusiasm"). Schemes are necessary, however, and the arrangement of this book will be no pitfall if no chapter is taken by itself as a final word on the age and if the reader who is interested in a particular subject is careful to supplement individual sections by reading according to index.

The abundance of facts and statistics and the author's reading in all kinds of out-of-the-way sources increases the value of the picture he gives us, yet the more we read the more difficult it becomes to form any "pat" characterizations of the period. Houghton shows that the Victorians saw themselves as living in an age not primarily of democracy or industrialism or optimism but in an age of *transition*. And it was not the Romantic period or the 18th century which they had outgrown—it was the Middle Ages. *The Victorian Frame of Mind* is therefore especially interesting as a picture of what happens to people who live in a time when the old order is being eclipsed: "Christian orthodoxy under the rule of the church and civil government under the rule of the king and nobility, the social structure of fixed classes . . . and the economic organization of village agriculture and town guilds." Though the process had begun much earlier, in the Victorian age the passing of the old order is seen in high relief because by then there was no area of life which was not threatened by radical changes which appeared to be coming with greater and greater momentum. Thus "the Victorians moulded their world view on the sense of peril as well as the sense of growth" and "their errors were those of men afraid of the darkness."

—Corbin S. Carnell

*The Doctrine of Eternal Punishment*, by Harry Buis. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1957. xi + 148 pp. \$2.75.

In a three page preface the author states his reasons for writing this book. First, it is a Scriptural doctrine generally denied or ignored to-day; second, there are no major works extant defending the doctrine; third, the mistaken attitude of many evangelicals toward the doctrine; and fourth, the man on the street fails to take it seriously.

Another helpful device to prepare the reader is the frank statement of plan on the first page that it will be an historical survey of the doctrine. The plan will include what the Bible teaches about it and what Christians have believed about it since. An example of this method can be shown from the first chapter. In fourteen pages the author explains and summarizes the

Old Testament teachings on the doctrine of eternal punishment aided by numerous quotations from such writers as G. F. Oehler, J. P. Lange, C. Hodge, W. O. E. Oesterley, S. C. Barlett, F. Delitzsch, and A. B. Davidson. The summary method continues for the inter-testamental period, the teaching of the New Testament, the pre-Reformation, Reformation and post-Reformation periods. In chapter seven two basic denials, namely universalism and annihilation are examined and refuted. This is done by the citation and exegesis of appropriate scripture. In the space of nine pages the author outlines the present-day conservative position on this doctrine. This must of necessity be merely sketched but it does disassociate the gruesome additions of some crass fundamentalism from the basic doctrine.

The inclusion of anecdotes and quotations from contemporary sources greatly enlivens what might otherwise be just a master's thesis. Some will find three short appendices packed with as much interest and controversial matter as the rest of the book. The subjects of "Infant Salvation or Damnation," "The Heathen who have not Heard the Gospel" and "Denial by the Cults" are treated here. In the latter appendix Buis lists the denials of this doctrine by seven present-day cults.

This little book is a good popular and summary treatment of a little-known and less-appreciated doctrine of the faith once delivered. It should have a wide use among lay people, young people, young Christians and others who do not have or want access to standard theological works.

Mechanically the book is easy to read with footnotes at the bottom of each page. There is no index, or, what could be more helpful in a book of this type, a list of the Scripture references used.

—Charles G. Schauffele

*Henry Watterson*, by Joseph F. Wall. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. xvi + 362 pp. \$6.00.

The "Reconstructed Rebel," as Wall subtitles his work, provides us with more than an interesting biography of a famous newspaper editor. It is an inside picture of an important era in American history (note the present popularity of Civil War literature) and as such deserves careful reading. Half-blind Henry Watterson not only lived in this era (1840-1921) but helped to shape it. It is not insignificant that he early developed a love of history. In an age of flamboyant journalism Watterson's witticisms and outspoken views, although not always appreciated, certainly made news. And well they should; for they are part and parcel of the best in the liberal tradition. In our day of fifth amendment cases, pussy-footed fence sitters, timid editorials and few crusaders Mr. Wall has made a major contribution by calling to our attention at least two facets of American freedom; the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press.

Watterson's Democratic political background and his love for the South, coupled with his editorship (after 1868) of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, gave the newspaper national significance and made its editor a respected critic of both his own party and ruling regimes in Washington. "Marse Henry" an original supporter of Greeley in 1872 and a major backer of Tilden in 1876 had a long wait before the Democrats elected a president. In discussing these events Wall gives us a good picture of practical politics so well learned and used by Watterson. As "Veep" Barkley wrote in the introduction, "He walked with gods and never lost the common touch."

Oxford is to be congratulated again for its continuance of high publishing standards. Binding, format, the clear type and index are all good. The "Notes and Footnotes" serve as a useful bibliography. It is however, somewhat awkward to follow footnotes placed in the rear of the book and a few pictures would have added to the fine descriptions found in the text. Nevertheless, here is historical literature at its best. Time will tell, but this work should prove to be the standard biography of Henry Watterson.

— C. Milburn Keen, Jr.

*Outlines for the Study of the Bible as Literature*, by David C. Fowler. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1956. 82 pp. \$1.50.

This book by a teacher at the University of Washington purposes to present the Bible as a literary work rather than as theology. The author, of course, realizes that one cannot divorce ideas from literature—especially great ideas—but he attempts to restrict the study of the Bible to the "approaches customary in any class devoted to the study of literary texts," and adds that "interpretations based on theological assumptions cannot be allowed unless they can be defended by reference to the text itself" (11). He does not state just how the latter is to be decided. His bibliography of general background reading is noticeably lacking in conservative works so that a student will learn little of such an approach to the content and problems of the Bible, even as literature.

The general approach to the Bible follows that of the Wellhausen school and its modern followers which divides the Old Testament into documents and detects or premises an evolution of religion which involves an anti-supernaturalism. The author has a right to his views, but his intent of avoiding extremes in either direction is not achieved in his suggested background reading, his helps, or his review questions. The conservative student will find the book loaded against him, the seeker will find himself exposed to a negatively critical approach with little opportunity of learning the conservative position, and the liberal will remain in ignorance of any other view.

The outlines of the Bible books themselves are helpful for quick review and organization and the review questions are stimulating. The other study aids are also helpful as far as they go, but they all go in one direction.

The book will be more helpful in class use under the guidance of a teacher than in private study.

—Earl B. Robinson

*Christ's Kingdom and Coming*, by Jesse Wilson Hodges. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957. xii and 247 pp. \$3.00.

It is somewhat of a phenomenon to see a book which is an adverse analysis of dispensationalism coming from a Baptist. Dr. Jesse Wilson Hodges is a superintendent of missions in the Southern Baptist Church. His work is an evaluation of dispensationalism from the point of view of its teaching as to the nature of the Messianic Kingdom. As such it is a good piece of work and well justifies the effort involved. In discussing the Kingdom the author deals with the subject as it is presented in the covenants of the Old Testament as well as in prophecy. He shows very effectively that the covenants of God with Abraham and with David were universal in their foreview rather than nationalistic and that they were conditional rather than unconditional as has so often been maintained by dispensational brethren. In the main the exposition of Old Testament passages is accurate from the reviewer's standpoint although rather more brief than might be expected. For example, in his consideration of the Kingdom in Ezekiel the author omits entirely any reference to chapters 40 through 48. Since this is a rather crucial passage for those who look for a restoration of an earthly Israelitish Kingdom with a reconstructed temple it would appear that it would have been wise to consider this particular prophecy.

Particularly effective is the writer's consideration of the gospel of the Kingdom as preached by Jesus and the apostles. Since it was at this point that your reviewer first came to question the dispensational system to which he had for some time adhered, he found that Dr. Hodges had handled the subject with exegetical skill and discernment.

It is with regret that one mentions a number of defects in the book, the most noticeable of which is the author's failure to understand covenant theology. When he states that the covenant theology is a view which "(supposedly) enables parents by means of circumcision, baptism, or other rites to take their children with them into the kingdom of God" or that our justification as Christians is on covenantal grounds rather than the ground of the work of Christ, or that federal theology is in a class with that of Darby, its most ardent opponent, it would seem that he has been carried away by a prejudice against paedobaptism. Surely where brethren disagree it is well to estimate the other point of view fairly rather than to caricature it.

There are some typographical errors in the book and it is rather noticeable that at least two authors whose work is mentioned in the text are not listed in the bibliography, namely O. T. Allis and David Brown. Otherwise this book is deserving of commendation and a wide reading. It will surely help the student of prophecy and eschatology as well as the Bible student in general to a better understanding of the gospel. The book may be read with appreciation by the interested layman as well as the theological student.

—David W. Kerr

*The Call of the Minaret*, by Kenneth Cragg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. xv and 356 pp. \$6.25.

Five times a day from the innumerable minarets of the Muslim world the muezzin sounds forth the call to prayer, "God is most great . . . there is no god except God . . . Muhammed is the apostle of God. Come ye unto prayer. Come ye unto good. . . ." Using the phrases of the Adhan, the Call of the minaret, as the basis for the first half of his book, Dr. Cragg presents the historical and doctrinal principles of Islam. As editor of the Muslim World and professor of Arabic and Islamics at the Hartford Seminary Foundation, the author speaks with authority out of a wide knowledge of the faith of Muhammed. He continually relates both faith and practice not only with their classical foundations but with the world of the twentieth century. There is real insight and appreciation of the values of the religion of Islam. If the author does not seem to deal as critically as he might with what as a Christian he must deem a false religion, it is because his desire is to present the religion with all the force and power it has for its own adherents. This is a valuable and helpful evaluation of a religion that is a reawakened and powerful force in the world today.

It is in the second part of the book, however, that Dr. Cragg makes his most valuable contribution. In this section, called Minaret and Christian, he deals with the relationship and approach of the Christian to Islam. He is not speaking of coexistence with the Arab world, but of the Christian obedience to the commission of Christ to preach the Gospel to every creature. These chapters are written for the missionary and for those who pray for missions. The chapter headings indicate the scope of his message: The Call to Understanding; The Call to Service, the medical and educational ministry; The Call to Retrieval. In a long chapter, The Call to Interpretation, he indicates the major task. How is the Christian to interpret God, the Bible, the Person and Work of Christ to those whose basic presuppositions are so alien to those of the Christian? There is finally The Call to Patience as he speaks of the problems of Muslim response and the testing of those who leave Muhammed for Christ.

There are times when one feels that Dr. Cragg is too academic; the freshness of actual missionary contact seems to be missing. But the man who goes out prepared by the understanding of the field and the task which is presented here will be a better and more effective missionary. There is a weakness in Cragg's own view of the Cross, which for him is primarily a symbol of God's love. It is certain that the approach to Islam with the evangelical truth of the substitutionary atonement would make a far more meaningful appeal. Nevertheless the vast store of knowledge, the contemporaneity and the very welcome readability make the book a signal addition to the understanding of this religion to which adhere a great portion of the world's population, and a most useful aid to any who look forward to missionary endeavor.

—Philip C. Johnson

*Harper's Annotated Bible: The Prophets*, by Julius A. Bewer. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. 663 pp. \$5.95.

This volume is the first of the clothbound library editions of Harper's Annotated Bible series. It contains the first nine issues of the Old Testament series, all of the prophetic books. The paperbound volumes are brief pamphlets costing ninety-five cents each, which are a boon to impudent students. There are also six New Testament issues up to the present.

The commentary contains the text of the King James Version with an introduction to each book and critical notes at the bottom of each page relating to the text above. The introductions are brief and to the point, giving the historical and religious background against which the prophet wrote and pertinent biographical thoughts about the author. The notes are a marvel of conciseness. For the most part they are textual, explaining the meaning of terms, amending or conjecturing the meaning of obscure passages, and sometimes bringing the King James English up to date. Though not as frequent as the textual notes there is a large body of interpretation included in the annotations.

Dr. Bewer, the editor of the Old Testament series and the author of these notes on the prophets, is an eminent Old Testament scholar. For many years he was professor of Hebrew at Union Theological Seminary. Biblically and theologically he is extremely critical and liberal, as these notes clearly indicate. For this reason one would not care to have this as his only commentary on the prophets. Used in combination with an evangelical work, however, it can be very helpful. The philological and historical contributions are valuable and even some of the critical interpretations are very thought-provoking.

—Philip C. Johnson

# SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

*Christian Graduate*, March. G. E. Barnes writes, "The Relation Between Science and Religious Knowledge" and there are articles on Catholicism and Reformation principles. The June issue discusses the problem of pain, suffering and evil.

*Christian Scholar* for March discusses the Reformation tradition and higher education. In June, Nels Ferré writes, "Contemporary Theology and Higher Education."

*Christianity Today*, May 12. A number of articles on Christian education.

*Concordia Theological Monthly* for June has an interesting discussion of Victor von Weizsäcker's view of natural theology and Genesis 1 and 2.

*Daedalus*, May 1957. Harold Medina, "A Liberal Education and the Advancement of American Freedom." The recent Winter issue is on science and the modern world view with articles by Henry Guerlac, Harcourt Brown, Georgio de Santillana, Philipp Frank, Robert Oppenheimer, Jerome Brunner, Percy Bridgeman, Charles Morris, and Mumford Jones. The Spring number has the text of the Pauling-Teller debate on fallout and disarmament, Clyde Kluckhohn on the evolution of contemporary American values, and Abraham Kaplan on American ethics and public policy.

*Diogenes*, number 21 has Eric Dardell on history and its philosophy today.

*Endeavor*, April. Gavin de Beer, "The Darwin-Wallace Centenary."

*Eternity* for June has an unpublished manuscript by Charles Hodge on "The Unity of the Church" and for July has Bernard Ramm on "Kierkegaard — The Danish Timebomb."

*Ethics* has an issue dealing largely with politics and ethics in April.

*Free University Quarterly*, March. S. U. Zuidema writes on existentialism.

*Harper's* in May has W. Heisenberg, "A Scientist's Case for the Classics."

*Hibbert Journal* for April has articles on the pro's and con's of South African apartheid, on divorce and the church, and on the possibility of a Christian social ethic.

*His*, June. W. H. Fuller writes on the need of literature on the mission field.

*Interpretation* for April contains L. Bullock writing on the Theosophical cults.

*Journal of the History of Ideas* in June has articles on Darwin's religious views and on Press and public reactions to Darwinism.

*Journal of Philosophy*, April 10. Articles on "What is Philosophy?" by Martin Wolfson and by Boughton on moral absolutes.

*Life*, June 30. Begins a series on Darwin, his theories and his work.

*Mind* for April has articles on philosophy and the practice of law, on determinism versus continuity in modern science, and on science and morality.

*National Review*. The June 14 issue discusses voluntary taxation. This is continued in the June 21 issue along with Russell Kirk and Max Eastman writing opposing views of John Dewey.

*New Scholasticism* for April has an article on depth psychology and the contribution of existential synthesis.

*Philosophy of Science*, April. R. Handy, "Philosophy's Neglect of the Social Sciences."

*Partisan Review* for Spring contains J. H. Raleigh on Victorian morals and the modern novel.

*Practical Anthropology* for March-April has Wm. Smalley on "The Cultural Implications of an Indigenous Church."

*Science*, May 2. B. Commoner, "The Fallout Problem: an example of the interaction between advancements of sciences and the conditions of society." On May 9, T. Dobzhansky writes on the mechanism of evolution and the uniqueness of man. R. J. Braidwood has a fine article on Near Eastern prehistory on June 20.

*Science Counselor*, June has a Catholic interpretation of Genesis One and a section on "The Argument from Authority" from van Laer's book reviewed here last fall.

*Torch and Trumpet* in May-June has Meredith Kline writing on Genesis 1 and 2 favoring, in a careful analysis, a semi-poetic form to the creation "week."

## FORTHCOMING FEATURES

Recognition of centenaries: the Winter Issue will be devoted to Darwin and the theory of evolution; Summer, 1959, to Dewey and modern education; Winter of the same volume to Calvin and the Reformation . . . Historical Materialism: Empirical or Metaphysical? . . . Edwin Arlington Robinson, Disinherited Puritan . . . The Metaphysical Fallacy of August Comte . . . The Withering of Unitarianism . . . The Weaker Brother and Christian Conduct.

### **"NOMINATED IN THE BOND"**

A Shakespearean phrase—it ought to be regarded as the most important consideration in an investment program. Schemes which may turn out well look attractive until compared with an insurance policy. "Tis nominated in the bond"—signed, sealed, and delivered. The company always honors its signature. The contract becomes a tie that binds clergymen in a close knit brotherhood. It must be remembered that for 241 years the Fund has never contested a claim. Its word is better than its bond.

*Write to . . .*

#### **PRESBYTERIAN MINISTERS' FUND**

Rittenhouse Square

Philadelphia 3, Pennsylvania

ALEXANDER MACKIE, *President*

BOSTON OFFICE: Presbyterian Ministers' Fund  
52 Beacon Street

Boston 8, Massachusetts

**1717      Two Hundred Forty-one Years      1958**